


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1 MARCH 1989



**FOREIGN
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JPRS Report

East Asia

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East Asia Southeast Asia

JPRS-SEA-89-014

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Chin Insurgents Desire To Unite With India
42000101a Calcutta SUNDAY in English
19-25 Feb 89 pp 15-17

[Article by Subir Bhaumik: "Inside Burma's Rebel Hide-outs"]

[Text] Burma's Chin state, which is twice the size of neighbouring Mizoram, appears to be preparing for a protracted bush war. Recent developments suggest that the insurgency will intensify. The Chin National Front (CNF)—an underground tribal outfit which had long been struggling for greater autonomy—has now called for secession. The CNF has an estimated 2,000 guerrillas. But its leaders claim to have recruited 4,000 more in the last four months or so, many of them students. The new recruits have been sent to camps in the states of Karen and Kachin to train with other tribal rebel outfits.

The transition from pressing for greater autonomy to demanding a separate state has an interesting twist. The CNF—the largest underground group representing the three million Chin population—sought support from the Indian Government for its secessionist designs. But recently, the tribal group went even further. It requested that Chin state become part of India. A letter written last fortnight by CNF chairman Pu Tialkhal to Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi reads: "The popular demand of the Chins is to unite with their ethnic group within the Indian Union. I therefore request your honour to suitably respond to our humble request to liberate the Chin people to enable them to join their brethren within the Indian Union." The letter goes on to plead that India provide the "necessary political and economic facilities for liberating Chins from the heavy yoke of the Burmese rulers."

The reference to the ethnic group within India that the Chins want to unite with is the Mizos, with whom they have much in common. Earlier, the CNF had fought for an independent Mizo-Chin state, but its leaders have apparently given this up now as an unviable idea. The willingness to become part of the Indian Union is related—oddly enough—to Rajiv Gandhi's politics. The many accords that the Prime Minister has signed with chief ministers of states dominated by minorities may be viewed as failures in India, but they have greatly impressed the Chins. Particularly, that with Laldenga in Mizoram. Said CNF chairman Tialkhal to SUNDAY: "We realise now...our best bet is in joining the Indian Union, where national minorities enjoy more rights and freedoms than in any other Asian state."

Added general secretary Michael Thangleimang: "Our only aspiration, if we join India, is a special administrative autonomy for Chins in India."

Tialkhal, a former police officer, formed the CNF in 1970. He was the zonal secretary for the Chin Hills between 1958 and 1962 and a member of the former Prime Minister U Nu's Parliamentary Democracy Party.

After General Ne Win pulled off his military coup, Tialkhal went underground and formed the Zomi Liberation Front (ZLF). The ZLF colluded with Laldenga's Mizo National Front (MNF) to fight for a separate Mizo-Chin state. Their partnership broke over the question of leadership. Laldenga wanted the ZLF to become part of the MNF, but Tialkhal insisted that their battle be waged through a 'joint command'. In time, the relation between the two groups soured. "Laldenga wanted to arrest the ZLF leaders and even sent his commandos," recalls Tialkhal.

With the formation of the CNF, the struggle became centred around the demand for greater autonomy for the Chin Hills region. Last year, the CNF became a member of the Democratic Alliance of Burma (DAB)—a loose confederation of 23 organisations ranged against the military regime of Saw Maung. DAB was constituted with four objectives: overthrowing Saw Maung's government; establishing a democratic government in Burma; ending the civil war and restoring peace; and bringing about national reconciliation and creating a federal union.

Among DAB's members are all the ten groups that form the National Democratic Front (NDF)—which was set up with similar objectives. The Front's constituents, however, were all tribal groups; DAB, on the other hand, has many members which represent the majority plainland Burmese. General Bo Mya of the Karen National Union is the elected chairman of DAB. The organisation has three vice-chairmen—General U Thwin of the People's Liberation Front, Maran Brangsein of the Kachin Independence Organisation and Nai Shwe Kyin of the New Mon State Party.

One indication of the confidence of DAB is, perhaps, its attempts to distance itself from the country's biggest left grouping—the Burmese Communist Party (BCP). The communists stand for a "broad-based unity of all revolutionary groups" and have offered DAB arms, training and sanctuary. DAB has shunned such offers. One reason for keeping the BCP at a distance could be ideology—DAB's political charter advocates free enterprise. Then, there is the suspicion of the party's role between 1981 and 1984, when it tried to secretly negotiate an understanding with the Ne Win government, due to Chinese pressure. Says Thangleimang: "The BCP can mortgage our revolution at China's insistence, if Beijing and Rangoon become friends."

The Chin guerrilla leaders appear hopeful of getting a positive response to their request from India. However, they admit that they have not received any reply whatsoever, yet. Last December, a Chin activist called Mangkhapau travelled to Delhi in an attempt to get an audience with the Prime Minister. Rajiv did not meet him, but he is reported to have met Union minister of state for home affairs, Santosh Mohan Dev. What transpired during the meeting is not known.

CNF leaders say that Mangkhapau had nothing to do with their organisation and has no following at all among the Chins. But it is well known that he is linked to some political leaders in India who have mooted a Mizo-Chin state.

The Chin leaders attach much importance and great hope to Rajiv Gandhi's remark during the recent Mizoram polls that "India sympathises with the democratic aspirations of the Burmese people." In the light of the fact that the government has strongly opposed the establishment of a Mizo-Chin state, the significance they accord this remark seems grossly misplaced. Moreover, Rajiv himself has said in Mizoram that India "doesn't want anybody's territory, including Burma's."

But the CNF plans to fight Saw Maung and his government even if Indian help is not forthcoming. Its members are being trained in guerrilla warfare by other tribal rebel outfits and, as Thangleimang says, it will not be difficult for them to procure arms even without India's help. "We can still give the government a fight," said the general secretary ominously.

Teak Sales Generate \$5.8 Million

42000101b Rangoon *THE WORKING PEOPLE'S DAILY* in English 19 Feb 89 p 1

[Text] Rangoon, 18 Feb—The Timber Corporation of the Ministry of Agriculture & Forestry sold teak by auction to foreign companies from Hong Kong, Singapore, Thailand, Japan, India and European countries on 16 and 17 February. The sale of teak by auction for the second time was made at the Timber Corporation head office in Ahlone Township, Rangoon.

On 16 February, 75 representatives from foreign firms competed in the bidding and bought a total of 70 lots of teak weighing 4,389.910 tons and altogether 3.28 million U.S. dollars (over K21 million) was realised.

On 17 February, 56 representatives from foreign firms bought a total of 106 lots of teak weighing 3,914.772 tons and altogether 3.5 million U.S. dollars (over K22 million) was realized.

Altogether 8,304.682 tons of teak were sold by auction for 6.8 million U.S. dollars (over K43.3 million).—NAB

Insurgents Set Fire to Rice Mills, Warehouses

42000101d Rangoon *THE WORKING PEOPLE'S DAILY* in English 21 Feb 89 p 11

[Excerpt] Rangoon, 20 Feb—A group of about 20 Mon insurgents at 2:30 am on 14 February entered the Ohn-bonkwin village, Yebyu Township, Tenasserim Division. The insurgents fired shots, burnt down rice mills and rice godowns and fled to Thechaung village. Due to the insurgents a total of 6,746 baskets of paddy was destroyed.

Similarly, a group of 30 Karen and BCP (Burma Communist Party) insurgents at 1:30 am on 17 February entered the Winwa village in Thayetchaung Township and burnt down the Agriculture Corporation office and its godown. Due to the insurgents, a total of 732 baskets of paddy, 1,150 gunny bags, a meeting hall, a storage depot and stationery were destroyed. [passage omitted]

KNU Insurgents Raid Villages

42000101c Rangoon *THE WORKING PEOPLE'S DAILY* in English 21 Feb 89 p 2

[Excerpt] Rangoon, 20 Feb—About 30 members of the KNU (Karen National Union) insurgents, on the evening of 12 February, opened fire with M-79 launchers and small arms at a civilian truck No 4225, which left Auk-bo-te village of Kawkaik Township and stopped it. They then robbed the passengers of their property. [passage omitted]

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KAMPUCHEA

Thai Visitor Examines Economic, Social Conditions

42000103b Bangkok *BANGKOK POST* in English
28 Feb 89 p 28

[Article by Suvit Suvit-sawasdi]

[Excerpts] Stepping from the boat onto Koh Kong in Kampuchea after the two-hour jaunt from Trat Province in Thailand, it's hard not to notice that much of what struck the eye is very familiar. The town of Paak Khlong on this small Kampuchean island is a major venue for trade between Thailand and Kampuchea, and Thai goods are everywhere.

"Eighty per cent of the goods come from Thailand," said Trat MP Thanit Traiwuthi of the Prachachon Party, "and a lot of money changes hands at the market here. It totals about 100 million baht daily, 30 million baht from Trat Province."

No wonder the Thai products are stacked up so high, with heavily-loaded long-tail boats constantly running back and forth to the mainland. A cargo-transport vessel carries second-hand cars and motorcycles to be sold in Kampuchea at incredibly low prices. Most of the vehicles are said to come from Singapore, as do large quantities of such luxury products as liquor and many brands of imported cigarettes at rock-bottom prices.

At first glance, Koh Kong looks like any other seaside town. About 50,000 people live there, and those of them whom I met all looked cheerful and content. One of the reasons for this could well be that the island enjoys economic conditions far better than those that prevail in other parts of the country. The local fishing industry enjoys the benefits of plentiful catches, and then there is the income from the market. So many of the residents are of Thai extraction that this trip to Kampuchea felt more like a sojourn to a Thai fishing town.

The first hour was filled with smiling welcomes, but after that the actual conditions in the border town revealed themselves bit by bit. Although Koh Kong is not among the areas that have been hardest hit by the war, evidences of the conflict are everywhere. We met crippled veterans frequently: some had arms and legs missing, and some who had lost both legs made their way around on small wheeled planks. One such veteran is Mr Eng Salon, 23, who also lost an eye in a battle during his country's civil war. [passage omitted]

Although he is originally from Kampot near the port city of Kampong Som, after completing medical treatment he was sent to Koh Kong as a disabled veteran together with many friends who had sustained similar injuries. On Koh Kong he and his friends have to beg for a living, since funding for the country's disabled veterans organisation is still insufficient.

"Our country is still extremely poor," he said. "Things have only just started to get better. We all understand the situation." He said that everyone hated and dreaded the Khmer Rouge, but that no one looked down on disabled soldiers like him and his friends. [passage omitted]

Mrs Rua See Thol graduated from high school in Phnom Penh, and now teaches the Principles of Socialism for 462 riels a month—a sum equal to about 100 baht. "But we get by," she says. "We don't worry about the way things are too much. There's always something to eat." [passage omitted]

Correspondent Comments on 16th National Assembly Session

42000103a Bangkok *POST* in English 3 Mar 89 p 6

[Article by Jacques Bekaert]

[Text] While the official news agency SPK was blasting the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK)—"The same old chorus"—for demanding the dissolution of the existing government in Phnom Penh, the National Assembly, holding its 16th session in the Kampuchean capital, was encouraging the People's Republic of Kampuchea to change drastically its mode of operation.

Phnom Penh's officials do not like any talk of "dismantling" the PRK (People's Republic of Korea)—in the case of some, the true believers, because they are convinced the present Marxist system represents the correct path for the country; in most other cases because they fear it would mean a loss of jobs and the end of a system to which they have become slowly identified with.

A few privileged cadres, in Phnom Penh and the provinces, must also see an end of the PRK as it stands today as a kiss of death to their relatively comfortable life. Like in most so-called socialist countries, there is a growing "nomenclatura" in the PRK. A change of regime will certainly not abolish privileges. I know a few Kampuchians, in Paris and elsewhere, who would like nothing more than engrave their own name on the "nomenclatura" list, all in the name of sacrificing themselves for the supreme good of the poor masses, of course!

The PRK's position, as expressed again and again, at JIMs and elsewhere, is clear. "It is absurd to put on the same footing the existing government in Phnom Penh—a legal, real and effective institution inside the country as well as abroad—with the CGDK that is a pretentious appellation designed to prop up the phantom government in exile and does not control a single inch of territory." (SPK, February 13, 1989).

On the other hand some serious changes are at present taking place in Kampuchea—an unfinished process by all means—which are slowly modifying the original Marxist-Leninist credo of the PRK.

This transformation process was well illustrated during the most recent session of the National Assembly, a body elected in May 1981 and, like its counterpart in Vietnam, appears to have gained at least a minimum amount of intellectual independence from the traditional party organs.

The 16th session closed on February 11, after a six-day sitting.

Many of the debates reflected the changing socio-economic conditions in the country and the efforts made by the PRK to adjust to market reality.

One of the reasons people in Kampuchea managed to survive during the crisis years of 1979-1984 was largely thanks to this most celebrated institution: the black market. Except that in the PRK there had been no serious attempt to socialise small shops and smuggled goods travelling from Thailand, Singapore or Hong Kong were sold openly, often at lower prices than in the country of origin. Unlike Vietnam there had been no real crackdown on the market.

Today it is so much a fact of life that a few weeks ago a senior provincial party official told me proudly that the smuggling of foreign beer was one of the party's most successful activities and that it was "not that illegal since once on the market it became legal."

But general difficulties, a desperately slow growth of the economy, poor harvests, threat to security and the general existence of the PRK as well as the appeal of the CGDK propaganda praising the virtues of a free enterprise type economy led the central government and the party to some fairly drastic revisions.

"We had to do it for the happiness of the people," Mr Hun Sen told me recently. Do what?

Well, transform the PRK from an (intellectually) strict socialist regime into a kind of mixed-bag affair leaving much room for improvisation and private creativity, changes that little by little amount to unspoken transformation (I would not dare to use the word dismantling) of at least the nature of the state. Two articles of the Constitution (articles 12 and 19) were modified during the previous session of the National Assembly last year. It paved the way for joint ventures and a greater role of the private entrepreneurs.

The last National Assembly amended the Constitution on "the tenure and use of land," after "considering the labourers' right of ownership as well as the respect for their legitimate wishes and aspirations, because the labourers have made enormous sacrifices for the national construction and defence." (Report on closing Assembly session: SPK February 13, FBIS February 13).

Before 1975, most Kampuchean peasants were owners of their land. So any reform that deprived them of this traditional right was unwelcome. The "Samaki" (solidarity) production group installed by the PRK in 1979 were never popular. They are being phased out.

As the report noted, "these modifications may become an economic impetus for agricultural production to quickly develop, favouring the spiritual serenity of the population and representing a propulsive force for expanding cultivated areas and ensuring land protection."

Feeding people properly is still one of PRK's main problems. As demonstrated anywhere in the world, peasants work better and harder on their own land. It took urban intellectuals to believe the contrary and three-quarters of a century for socialist regimes to discover the fact The PRK is on the right track. It is also anxious to deny the resistance its share of rice and foodstuff. This is partly a matter of money. Who pays more? So far it has been the resistance. Khmer Rouge especially, but the PRK is closing the gap.

Private property was once a dirty word, at least among communists, socialists, anarchists and thousands of well-meaning, often idealistic progressives. "Property is robbery," wrote the French anarchist Proudhon. In many cases it was. But times are changing. Western democracies have shown that social progress goes along very well with the right of ownership. People like to have something of their own, a place they can call home and which is their "castle." Kampucheans are no different from the British. So the "National Assembly urges the Council of Ministers to solve as quickly as possible the problems of lodging in the cities of the country, to fight against the negligence in the tenure of houses." But will will go further. Like in nearby Vietnam (at least Ho Chi Minh City), one will be able to buy a house in Phnom Penh or any other city.

Changing the basis of the economic system, moving away from a state-run economy will, and does already, affect the political nature of the regime. During the past few months there has been within the party and among intellectuals a lively debate on the meaning of democracy, the future of the PRK and what the system should be like.

Which explains why the National assembly told the party and the Government that there is a "Need to re-examine the manner with which to lead and manage the state and the society which from now on requires fundamentally superior, new qualities on the basis of a work system that is new, clear, scientific, with fewer cadres, fewer formalities but greater effectiveness."

The poor quality of party and state cadres has plagued the socialist world for decades. Bureaucratism has wrecked prosperous countries with more determination than wars and natural disasters.

Vietnam is now allowing private schools to supplement the deficient state system. Kampuchea has suffered from civil war, brutal radical communist repression and the exodus of many (but no all) of its best educated civil servants. To make the system more flexible, less centralized, less unimaginative is "the key factor to eliminate and keep away the complex difficulties stemming from bureaucratism and various other negative incidents." In other words, to eliminate gross abuse of power by cadres and to ensure better protection for the private citizen.

Concluded the National Assembly: "It is necessary to examine, study and adopt a new concept and a new psychology to govern according to the principles of strengthening democracy...and create favourable conditions that would allow the masses to have the encouragement to say the truth, to express their personal views, and thereby, to improve the effectiveness of the state and government leadership."

It will be a long task. Even a political solution to the conflict will offer no guarantees that the administration of the country, the quality of the civil servants and the protection of basic human rights will be better. In the meantime, the present well-intentioned transformations within the PRK are certainly welcome by the majority of Kampucheans.

Income From Traditional Medicine Export
BK1803042889 Phnom Penh Domestic Service
in Cambodian 1300 GMT 17 Mar 89

[Text] In 1989, the department in charge of buying, exporting, and importing traditional medicine raw materials of the Health Ministry plans to earn \$200,000 from exporting traditional medicine raw materials.

During the first quarter of this year, our service exported a consignment of raw materials and traditional medicines resulting in an income of over \$29,000 for the state. To ensure bigger incomes, the service is contacting various provinces throughout the country to publicize new medicines the ministry wants to buy for export. The provinces which have access to raw materials and traditional medicines and provided them to the ministry are Kratie, Kompong Thom, Kompong Cham, and Kompong Speu. The provinces which have sold raw materials and medicines to the ministry have been sold locally-produced modern medicine at appropriate prices.

In 1988, the service exported raw materials and traditional medicines worth more than \$150,000 of the annual plan of \$200,000.

Trade Ministry Backs Expansion of Exports

42130061b Jakarta PELITA in Indonesian 8 Feb 89 p 11

[Text] Jakarta, PELITA—President Suharto welcomes the interaction and close cooperation existing among the private sector, regional governments, and the Department of Trade [DEPDAG] in the production of commodities that boost exports.

In fact, the president recommends that the things performed through the involvement of cooperation in Java and Sumatra be done in other regions also.

The head of state said this to Minister of Trade Dr Arifin Siregar and Junior Minister for Trade Sudrajat Djiwandono when they reported on several matters related to DEPDAG at the president's residence on Cendana Street, Jakarta, on Tuesday [7 February].

With respect to interaction related to exports, Dr Arifin Siregar told reporters he had reported to the president on the finished clothing industry in Bali, in which the private sector, the regional government, and DEPDAG have demonstrated very close cooperation in the last several years. Goods for export have also been manufactured in the villages.

Arifin Siregar evaluated the cooperation established in Bali as very good, and he expressed his desire to develop the same conditions in West Sumatra so that the operators of small industries in that area can be united.

Reciprocal Purchases

The junior minister of trade also explained Indonesia's reciprocal purchase trade with Iraq and Iran.

President Suharto directed that reciprocal purchase trade relations always be monitored, for we must see how much is realized from each commodity and ensure that revenues be adjusted to the oil purchases we make.

Sudrajat said this reciprocal trade involves the purchase of crude oil from Iraq and Iran in the amount of 30,000 barrels per day from each. If the value of all of this is calculated using the current price, we must pay between \$140 million and \$150 million.

The junior minister explained that in order to expand our exports of nonoil commodities we held talks with Iraq and Iran about their being required to buy Indonesian products, in addition to our buying crude oil from them.

At the end of last November, we bought from Iran oil valued at \$15 million, which was paid for in 3 months, and contracts were signed for the purchase of paper and several other commodities.

They also reported to the president on the visit by an Iraqi Department of Industry delegation to Indonesia for the purpose of seeing Indonesian textile production

firsthand. According to the junior minister, the Iraqi delegation wanted to buy textile machinery like that made by companies in Indonesia.

Sudrajat acknowledged that the crude oil from Iraq has not been shipped, but at the end of this month he expects a shipment of the same amount of crude oil as sent by Iran. The trade contract calls for the export to Iraq of 50,000 tons of concrete reinforcement steel worth \$22 million.

"Other commodities in the first contract are plywood and blockboard worth \$3.5 million, plus other commodities. Iraq will soon send a delegation to Indonesia to see other commodities, such as CPO [crude palm oil] and tea," said the junior minister of trade.

Textiles and Tapioca

The minister of trade also reported to the president on category 4 textile export quotas to EEC countries and on plans for talks about a similar arrangement for tapioca.

He explained that the Indonesian tapioca quota established by the EEC for 1987-1988 was 825,000 tons, nearly all of which was fulfilled. He acknowledged, however, that some of the exported tapioca originated from imports.

Because the Department of Agriculture has persuaded farmers to expand domestic tapioca production, he fears that the quota will not be enough to accommodate the tapioca being produced for export. "Therefore, we are going to send a delegation to Europe to discuss raising the 825,000-ton quota," he said.

Arifin Siregar has recommended to the EEC that tapioca imports from Indonesia be accompanied by certificates of origin, which are important for distinguishing between tapioca from Indonesia and that from other countries. Thus, 100 percent of the quota allocated to Indonesia can be maintained for accommodating our domestic production.

The minister also reported to the president on the importance of expanding trade and economic ties with the EEC generally, since an EEC common market will be implemented in Europe in 1992.

For that reason, the minister of trade will go to West Germany at the invitation of that country's government to see what forms of cooperation can be further established.

One form of cooperation proposed by the West German Government is to make the city of Bremen a site for introducing Indonesian products to EEC countries. In fact, according to Arifin Siregar, the West German Government will provide special facilities for educating Indonesian businessmen on how to use exhibits.

The head of state instructed the minister of trade not to limit himself to West Germany and the Netherlands alone in his efforts to expand trade but to make approaches to other EEC countries, too.

Feature Describes U.S. Aircraft Downings, POW Captures

42060036b Vientiane PASASON in Lao 11 Jan 89 p 2

["40, 20 January 1949-20 January 1989" column by Thanongsak Vongsakda: "The Brilliant Victory of Our Forces in the Struggle Against the Imperialists"]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] Victories during the struggle against the United States, 1955-1975:

1. Drove 231,359 enemy troops from the battlefields.
2. Killed 138,182 enemy troops.
3. Wounded 39,943 enemy troops.
4. Captured 48,875 enemy troops.
5. Surrendered, 4,359 enemy troops.

These included various troops, such as :

1. Vientiane forces, 204,010 troops.
2. Thai forces, 11,119 troops.
3. Saigon forces, 15,851 troops.
4. American forces, 389.
5. Destroyed or seized 77,359 weapons of various types.
6. Shot down 2,519 aircraft.
7. Destroyed 249 MROU [Mekong River Operations Unit] boats.
8. Destroyed 1,885 vehicles.
9. Destroyed 110 important bridges.
10. Destroyed 515 weapons depots.
11. Destroyed 12 radar instruments.
12. Destroyed 199,000 tons of war materials. [passage omitted]

As a result of these achievements, the Lao People's Army became known as the "heroic Lao Army." Today, the army is emulating to win new victories and score new achievements. [passage omitted]

Summary of War Exploits, U.S. Aircraft Downings

42060039b Vientiane KONGTHAP PASASON LAO in Lao 5 Jan 89 pp 2, 3

["Heritage Review" column: "Historic Victories"]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] After we conquered the American imperialists in Phou Khoun Building, Vang Vieng and Kasi, our army and people made another aggressive step to gain the famous victory in Louang Namtha, forcing the American imperialists and their henchmen to sign an agreement with Laos in 1962. In 5 years of being persistent we had a great victory by eliminating over 36,000 enemies from the battlefield, seizing and destroying nearly 20,000 assorted arms, and downing 14 aircraft of the air pirates, and all of this has been gloriously recorded in our history books.

The ink on the 1962 Geneva accord had not yet dried before the American imperialists and their revolutionary henchmen shamelessly destroyed our national coalition government, murdered Mr Kinin Phonseua, and again spread the war. In order to support the puppet regiments who were their henchmen, in 1964 the American imperialists used what they considered their strong air force to insanely destroy our liberated zones. However, in order to resolutely protect the stability of the nation our army and people faced many difficulties, yet they mobilized the power of the people of the whole nation to fight strongly and steadily against the enemies, and obtained the famous victories in the Plain of Jars, Xieng Khouang, Phou Kout, Nam Bak, Pha Thi, and others. As a result, the special strategic war of the American imperialists suffered a shameful defeat. After 5 years of persistent and brave fighting from 1964 to the end of 1968, the patriotic military forces and the people of multiethnic groups eliminated over 68,500 enemy troops from the field of battle, seized and destroyed nearly 19,500 guns, downed 982 U.S. aircraft, and expanded the liberated zones.

Without thinking of the injuries or deaths, after Nixon became U.S. president he at once experimented with his war-mongering theories in our country. The war operation was called "restoring honor", and the textbook for the operation spoke of using U.S. aircraft plus special forces to invade and encroach upon the Plain of Jars. However, they were destroyed by the army and the people of Xieng Khouang Province, who cooperated bravely with the army and the people throughout the nation. This painful defeat turned the "restoring honor" operation into an embarrassing "destruction of honor" operation.

With their continuing invasion the American imperialists searched for every possible way to continue the Nixon theory with a new textbook. That was why they mobilized tens of thousands of Saigon puppet troops backed by U.S. soldiers and the U.S. air force to open the Lamson Operation 719 by an invasion along Route 9 in the liberated zone in Savannakhet Province. However, once again they were defeated by the army and people of the

south who proudly and firmly cooperated with the army and people throughout the nation. Although the United States and its henchmen were badly defeated strategically, they stubbornly continued taking risks. The American imperialists used a third textbook on implementing Nixon's theory by using mercenaries of the Thai reactionaries plus the special forces and the U.S. air force to once more invade the Plain of Jars and Xieng Khouang. Their struggle in risking life was severely punished by the army and the people of Xieng Khouang. After only 4 days we had annihilated 20 battalions, including 10 battalions of the Thai reactionary mercenaries. As Nixon's textbook theories were demolished, our army and the people throughout the nation widened their victorious position by attacking enemy strongholds and by their fierce struggle against the attacks by the enemies, and accordingly continued to gain victories. Over a 4 year period of fighting against the Nixon theory we annihilated over 108,000 enemies, seized and destroyed over 29,000 various guns, and downed 1,487 U.S. marauding aircraft.

In conclusion, during 18 years of national liberation against the American imperialists and their henchmen, our military forces and our people and ethnic groups carried on the glorious heritage of our ancestors, promoting revolutionary heroism through the most critical transition period. Our people were united and defeated the clever and cruel strategies and tactics of the American imperialists, obtaining a famous victory such as never before in our nation's history. We annihilated over 218,700 enemies including Americans, Thai reactionary soldiers, Saigon puppet soldiers, and Lao puppet soldiers. We seized and destroyed over 75,700 rifles and downed 2,483 U.S. aircraft. And we liberated four-fifths of the land containing more than half of our nation's population. [passage omitted]

Results of the Fight Against the French Colonialists, the American Imperialists and Their Henchmen

The 8-9 year period of fighting against the French colonialists, the American imperialists and their henchmen in 1945-1954:

Number of enemies eliminated on the battlefield	35,071
Number of enemies killed	20,761
Number of enemies injured	6,865
Number captured and surrendered	7,445
The enemies eliminated on the battlefield:	
Lao puppet soldiers	31,264
French soldiers	3,807
Arms seized and destroyed	14,335 guns and rifles
Trucks destroyed	110

The 20-year period of fighting against the American imperialists 1955-1975:

Number of enemies eliminated on the battlefield	231,258
Number killed	138,082

Results of the Fight Against the French Colonialists, the American Imperialists and Their Henchmen

Number injured	39,943
Number captured and surrendered	48,874
Uprisings of the people	4,359
Breakdown of the enemies who were wiped out from the battlefield, in addition to the Lao puppet soldiers	
American imperialists and their henchmen	369
Saigon puppet soldiers	15,861
Thai reactionary soldiers	11,119
Assorted guns seized and destroyed	77,359
Aircraft downed	2,159
Telegrams, telephones and radios destroyed	2,750
Assorted trucks destroyed	1,885
Ships seized and sunk	249
Important bridges destroyed	110
Warehouses and military housing destroyed	515
Radar and other installations destroyed	12 locations
Other war equipment seized and destroyed	over 199,000 tons

Results for the 30-year period:

Minor and major combats	over 8,600 times
Number of enemies eliminated from the battlefield	266,329
Number of enemies killed	158,843
Number of enemies injured	46,808
Enemies captured and surrendered	56,319
Uprising toward the people	4,359

Breakdown of the enemies who were eliminated from the battlefield, in addition to the Lao puppet soldiers and the Vang Pao special forces:

American imperialist soldiers and their henchmen	4,176
Saigon puppet soldiers	15,861
Thai reactionary soldiers	11,119
Assorted guns	91,691
Aircraft downed and destroyed	2,519
1959-1963	14
17-5-64 to 18-11-72	2,469
6-1-73 to 18-1-75	36
Telegrams, telephones and radios seized and destroyed	2,753
Ships shot, sunk and seized	249
Important bridges destroyed	110
Warehouses and soldier's housing destroyed	515
Radar and other command machines destroyed	12
War equipment and other items seized and destroyed	over 200,000 tons
Assorted trucks seized and destroyed	1,995

After power was seized and transferred to the people throughout the nation, we wiped out the military organizations, the military forces, and all the war vehicles of the American imperialists on 23 August 1975.

U.S., PRC, Thais Blamed for Resistance Activity

42060036a Vientiane PASASON in Lao

13 Jan 89 pp 2, 3

[Article by S. Litalat: "The People and Soldiers of Khong District Before the 40th Anniversary of the Founding of the Army"]

[Excerpts] Khong District is one of the 10 districts in Champassak Province. Militarily, it is a very important district. Highway 13 runs through the district to Cambodia. [passage omitted]

The American imperialists and Chinese expansionists are still plotting to destroy the Lao revolution as well as the revolution of the three Indochina countries, particularly the young LPDR (Lao People's Democratic Republic). They have constantly sent their lackeys in Thailand, who have been given military training by the Chinese reactionaries and right-wing Thai powerholders, to stir up trouble and create splits between the cadres and people in Khong District. On the night of 18 June 1988, they sent 46 people to rob a unit. They crossed the Mekong River in a boat and landed on the east bank in Khong District.

After landing in Khong District, they boldly ambushed our local forces, destroyed some vehicles, robbed a store, and prevented people from engaging in production. They also stole some food from the people and stirred up trouble among the people daily.

In order to prevent the enemy from growing stronger, soldiers and people under the guidance of the Khong District Combat Leadership Committee and guerrilla forces in Na Fang, Houi Haiboung, Hataikhun, and Katang, which are located along the Mekong River, carried on an operation during the period 20 June-28 September 1988 to eliminate the enemy. The enemy was defeated and gradually withdrew. By 5 December 1988, the soldiers and people of Khong District had eliminated 38 of the enemy, of which 13 were killed and 23 were captured. Two others surrendered. Mr Pang, the leader of the enemy forces, was killed by Mr Somphon, a member of the Huai Sai Canton guerrilla company. He was killed in a rice field located approximately 7 km from Phon Sa-at. Mr Thongkham, the deputy commander, was killed by guerrilla forces from Mun District. Thus, three of the enemy leaders were killed this time. That included Mr Pouang, a reactionary leader in this area. The soldiers and people also seized a quantity of weapons and other military equipment, including 30 B-40, B-40.5, and AK rifles, almost 100 rounds of B-40 and B-40.5 ammunition, 13 "basso-61," more than 2,800 AK rounds, 32 mines, 54 mine fuses, 3 grenades, 1

pair of binoculars, 4 walkie-talkies, 2 compasses, 2 cameras, 2 radio transmitter-receivers, 2 "bang sup," and 40 inner tubes used to cross the river.

As a result of the victory scored by the people and soldiers of Khong District, those who made outstanding achievements were given certificates of merit by the provincial party committee. [passage omitted] A total of 175 people, 4 companies, two platoons, and 6 villages were given certificates of merit by the Provincial Military Command. Another 241 people were given certificates of merit by the Khong District Party Committee.

These ceremonies were held on 28 September 1988 at the Phon Sa-at Combat Headquarters in Huai Sai Canton and on 10 December 1988 on the occasion of our 13th National Day. [passage omitted]

Soviets Install Public Security Communications Gear

42060035a Vientiane PASASON in Lao 19 Jan 89 p 1

[Text] Bolikhamxai Province has finished installing a 50-kw power generator and communications radio belonging to the Public Security Service. Work on this communications gear began at the end of 1988 with the help of Soviet experts. This will help improve security in this locality.

Wood Exports to USSR; Production Problems

42060037c Vientiane PASASON in Lao 1 Feb 89 pp 1,2

[Unattributed report: "The Plywood Factory Will Sell 1 Million Square Meters of Veneer to the USSR"]

[Text] In 1989 the Lao Plywood Factory will produce and sell 1 Million sq. meters of fan [veneer] to the USSR. In the first 6 months the factory will export 500,000 sq. meters of [veneer] to the USSR under the terms of the agreement signed with the Lao Fuel Oil Company.

Comrade Sikeo Phonphakdi, the director of the factory reported that in order to fulfill the plan and produce more than 800,000 sheets of plywood and more than 1 million sq. meters of [veneer] this year, factory officials had signed an agreement to buy 25,000 cubic meters of logs from forestry enterprises No. 1 and 3 and the Vientiane Province Forestry Company. In 1988 the factory produced more than 500,000 sheets of plywood and more than 700,000 sq. meters of [veneer]. It achieved an income of 733 million kip, and 40 percent of its production was exported.

As for the problem of distributing plywood abroad Mr Sikeo Phonphakdi said that each year the factory had fulfilled a large proportion of its obligation to sell plywood and veneer to the Lao Import-Export Company for distribution abroad. Nevertheless supplying plywood abroad has gone slowly, and the plan has not been fulfilled. This was not the fault of the factory directly because factory officials were not authorized to sign agreements to sell plywood abroad. It was the function of the Lao Import-Export Company to sell plywood abroad. For example in the past the factory produced plywood and wrapped it, but the shipping of the plywood abroad went slowly; the plywood was not taken care of by those responsible, and much of the already packaged plywood remained in warehouses.

Minister Thanks Australian Experts

42060037e Vientiane PASASON in Lao 28 Jan 89 p 1

[Unattributed report: "Ceremony To Thank Australian Experts"]

[Text] In the afternoon of 26 January in Vientiane City the Department for Foreign Advisors of the Ministry of Trade and Foreign Economic Relations held a ceremony to thank the Australian advisers who had carried out their international duties in Laos. It was held while Australia's 201st national day was being celebrated, and Mr Thongsoukhom Phounsavat, a Deputy Minister of Trade and Foreign Economic Relations, represented the Lao government in expressing praise and appreciation for the assistance given Laos by the Australian government and people on the basis of understanding and mutual respect.

He said that even though Laos and Australia were two countries with very different political systems, nevertheless this was not an obstacle for assistance and long-term good relations on the basis of peace and peaceful coexistence.

He emphasized that the Lao government and people would do everything they could to make relations and cooperation between the two countries more and more successful.

On this occasion he expressed his sincere admiration for the Australian experts who used their strength and intelligence to assist Laos.

Mr Philip Alan Jackson, the Australian Ambassador to Laos, expressed his view that Australia would continue to expand its assistance and to make it more effective, especially assistance to Lao agriculture and to the training of technical cadres.

Swedish Aid for Forestry Projects

42060029d Vientiane PASASON in Lao 26 Dec 88 p 1

[Text] In 1989, the Swedish SIDA (Swedish International Development Agency) Organization will give Laos a grant of 20,975,000 krona in order to expand forestry activities.

This aid will be used in various projects such as the Forest Resources Survey Project, the Forest Conservation Project, the Forestry Project, and the project to prevent people from felling trees to cultivate crops and encourage them to engage in settled farming in Luang Prabang Province. Aid will also be given to logging and lumber companies. Some of the money will be used to develop the rural areas in Bolikhamsai Province, to help Forest State Enterprise No 3, and to train a number of cadres.

The memorandum on this was signed on 23 December at the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. Mr Kham-uan Boupha, the deputy minister of agriculture and forestry, signed on behalf of Laos. Mr Tokvan Akatsem, the Swedish charge d'affaires to Laos and the head of SIDA in Laos, signed on behalf of Sweden.

Bridge To Be Constructed With Hungarian Aid

BK1603101589 Vientiane KPL in English
0918 GMT 16 Mar 89

[Excerpt] Vientiane, March 16 (OANA-KPL)—Laos and Hungary have agreed to jointly build Se Khampho bridge on Road No. 18 in Pathoumphon District, the southern province of Champassak.

The memorandum reached here yesterday between the Ministries of Communication and Transport of the two countries stipulates that Hungary will provide Laos gratis aid of 89 million forint and the Lao side is to be in charge of the actual construction.

The construction of this 76-metre long reinforced concrete bridge will start in April this year and is expected to be completed in March 1991. [passage omitted]

Export Firm Seeks Links With Taiwan, Singapore

42060038e Vientiane PASASON in Lao 3 Feb 89 p 2

[Excerpts] In 1988 the Import-export Partnership under the Vientiane Capital Industrial Trade Section [passage omitted] engaged in foreign trading and has engaged in trade cooperation with foreign nations in many ways, such as in exchanging goods and trade with the SRV, and trade cooperation and exchanging goods with Thailand. The company went to Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan to study the market and the joint investment situation. However, the company did not succeed in the expected number in the last year plan, and its income was only 87.94 percent. It sent 89.02 percent of the year plan income to the treasury. The reason for its failure to achieve the expectation was because of many internal

and external problems. As Mr Ang Hanvisit, acting director of the Export-import Partnership, noted, trade that is not planned carefully will lose the market. Trade that has no connection with the market, that has no basis, and that lacks data concerning goods will be vulnerable to the free market and to illegal trade. Industrial goods from foreign countries have poured into the market, and as a result our domestic products could not be sold. Because our goods were not what the market wanted they became backlogged in the warehouse by as much as 171,331,334 kip. The company still lacks management principles such as regulations on materials management, regulations on withdrawing shares and selling stores, questions on wage and salary management, and a cohesive work method for the board of directors. Also, there is a lack of solidarity between the company and the shareholders. There is a lack of discussion, propaganda and training. They engaged in an autocratic work style, thus separating themselves from each other. There have been some complaints about high sales prices, low purchase prices, injustices, etc. [passage omitted]

Thai Investors Meet Politburo Official, Khamsai Souphanouvong

42060037b Vientiane PASASON in Lao 1 Feb 89 p 1

[Unattributed report: "Mr Oudom Khatthiya Received Representatives of Foreign Investors"]

[Text] In the morning of 31 January 1989 Mr Oudom Khatthiya, an alternate member of the Politburo of the Party Central Committee and Minister of Transportation, Post, and Construction, received representatives of foreign investors led by Professor Visai Saiseng. He is the president of the V.S.S. Company (Thailand) Ltd. It represents related companies from 16 capitalist countries which are investing in the LPDR (Lao People's Democratic Republic). On this occasion Mr Oudom Khatthiya reaffirmed past assurances to accommodate joint foreign investments in the LPDR in accordance with the foreign investment laws of the LPDR and on the basis of mutual advantage and equality as well as mutual responsibility, respect for independence and sovereignty, and non-interference in each other's internal affairs.

The representatives arrived in Vientiane City in the morning of 30 January, 1989. During their visit they called on Mr Khamsai Souphanouvong, an alternate member of the Party Central Committee and First Deputy Minister of the Economy, Planning, and Finance. In addition they signed an agreement to establish a joint Lao-Brunei airline (the Lao-Pacific Airline).

The representatives departed Vientiane in the evening of 31 January, 1989 after a visit of 2 days.

Background, Results of Cuban Aid

42060029b Vientiane PASASON in Lao 29 Dec 88 p 3

[Article by Duang Dao: "Lasting Friendship Between Laos and Cuba (on Cuba's 30th National Day—1 January 1959-1 January 1989)]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] After we announced the establishment of the LPDR (Lao People's Democratic Republic) on 15 September 1976, Laos and Cuba signed a treaty. On 1 January 1979, our two countries signed an unconditional treaty of technical aid. On 30 December 1981 at Havana, Cuba, we signed a treaty on organizing the first conference of the Joint International Economic, Scientific, and Technical Subcommittee, 1982-1983. In 1983, we signed a treaty on the second conference of this subcommittee for 1984-1985. In 1985, we signed a treaty for the years 1985-1987, and in 1987 we signed a treaty for the years 1987-1989.

Since 1985, Cuba has continued to provide aid to Laos. For example, it has provided aid in raising livestock. It has helped build and equip the cattle center at Na Bong, and sent 120 breeding cattle to Laos. This animal husbandry center can raise 350 head of cattle at one time. Today, Cuban veterinarians are working at this center. By November 1988, the center had produced 79,073 liters of milk. The chicken rearing center can care for 2,000 chickens. Cuban experts are also stationed at this center, which has already begun production. By November 1988, the center had produced 2,866,384 eggs. The two animal husbandry centers mentioned above are turn-key operations. There are now three teams of Cuban volunteers working in the public health sector. They are working in Sayaboury, Luang Prabang, and Vientiane provinces. In the education sector, Cuba has established a Spanish-language department at the Dong Dok Teachers College. It has provided instructors, who began teaching in 1984. As for posts and telegraph, our two countries have cooperated in producing stamps. Besides this, Cuba has helped train cadres and specialists by providing both short- and long-term training in Cuba. [passage omitted]

Toyota Thailand Plans Truck Exports

Bangkok BANGKOK POST in English 18 Feb 89 p 11

[Excerpts] Toyota Motors (Thailand) Co is to export locally assembled one-ton pick-up trucks to Laos before the lead-up to a major export programme to ASEAN and other countries, according to president Y. Nambu. [passage omitted]

Mr Nambu said Toyota Motors would soon begin export sales of pick-up trucks to Laos. If the project proves successful Toyota will expand export markets to ASEAN countries.

He said the company would also explore markets in other left-hand-drive car markets. Toyota of Japan has already promised its full support for the export drive, especially in marketing efforts.

He said the company's plans to export to Laos would be more feasible on completion of the Thai and Laotian governments' plan to build a "friendship" bridge across the Mekong River to link the two countries. Mr Nambu added that exports of pick-up trucks to Laos might be carried out on a counter-trade basis due to that country's financial constraints. [passage omitted].

'Leut Saisana' Comments on Cambodian Solution, PAVN Withdrawal

42060036d Vientiane PASASON in Lao 12 Jan 89 p 3

[Article by Leut Saisana: "An Outstanding Achievement in Solving the Cambodia Problem Using Political Means"]

[Excerpts] As for solving the Cambodia problem using political means, everyone knows that this problem must be solved on two fronts. Internally, the Cambodians must reach an agreement among themselves based on a policy of national reconciliation. On the international front, there are two related matters. One is the withdrawal of the Vietnamese volunteers. This must go hand in hand with taking steps to prevent the genocidal Pol Pot regime from regaining power in Cambodia.

The PRK (People's Republic of Kampuchea) and the SRV have announced that even if a political solution is not reached in Cambodia, all Vietnamese forces will be withdrawn from Cambodia by the end of the 1st quarter of 1990 at the latest. Thus, the withdrawal of the Vietnamese forces does not pose an obstacle to reaching a political solution. [passage omitted]

Based on the desire to achieve national reconciliation and solve the Cambodia problem as soon as possible using political means in order to satisfy the rightful demands of the Cambodian people, who only recently escaped the barbarity of the genocidal Pol Pot regime, and fulfill the wishes of the people of the world, on 6 January in Phnom Penh, Heng Samrin, the secretary general of the Party Administrative Committee and president of the PRK, announced that the PRK and the SRV had reached an agreement on the withdrawal of the Vietnamese volunteers. These forces will be withdrawn no later than September 1989. As for reaching a political solution, along with the withdrawal of the Vietnamese forces, other countries must stop providing military aid to the Cambodia factions, the Cambodian resistance forces must not be given refuge, and other countries must stop interfering in Cambodia's internal affairs. This must be done openly.

This announcement stemmed from the agreement reached by the governments of the PRK and the SRV. This is the best way to solve this problem. It is the most

reasonable solution to the Cambodia problem. This is in accord with the interests of all factions concerned with the Cambodia problem. This is an outstanding achievement in the effort to solve the Cambodia problem using political means. Because of this, it should be possible to solve this problem in the near future. [passage omitted]

Export Totals to Socialist Bloc

42060037h Vientiane PASASON in Lao 12 Jan 89 p 1

[Unattributed report: "The Lao Export-Import Company Will Export Goods Worth More Than 3.2 Billion Kip This Year"]

[Text] In 1989 the exports of the Lao Export-Import Company will amount to more than 3.2 billion kip. Of this, despite problems, the socialist countries will receive more than 2.8 billion kip. The most important exports for the Lao economy are agricultural and forest products.

Comrade Somchai Sitthinolada, the director of this company, said that in order to increase exports and fulfill goals, the company had worked to make the [procedures] for requisitioning goods from the people more effective by adopting goals such as: having direct contracts between localities and the state trade unit of the locality, especially in Champasak Province, Saravane Province, and Sekong Province. Another important [procedure] was using mutually agreed upon prices and using methods based on economics. In addition company officials also went out and got necessary goods and provided additional credit to farmers in order to encourage and assure their production, which will supply the needs of the company.

The director stressed that these were urgent duties which the company had to carry out. But it was also important that, in order to assure goods for export, local administrative officials at all levels increase their control over the sources of goods for export so that this control could be more effective than in the past.

In 1988 the company was able to export goods worth more than 2.8 billion kip.

Post-1975 Suppression Campaigns Against Enemy

42060036c Vientiane PASASON in Lao 12 Jan 89 p 2

["40, 20 January 1949-20 January 1989" column by Thanongsak Vongsakda: "Achievements Scored by Our Military Following Liberation"]

[Excerpts] Even though the country has won liberation and established the LPDR (Lao People's Democratic Republic), the enemies of the Lao liberation, with the help of their allies, are still trying to stir up trouble, disrupt the peaceful lives of our people, and prevent us from building the country. They are using psychological warfare methods and carrying on an intelligence war. They have made use of our weaknesses, such as our

economic weaknesses, and looked for other ways to stir up trouble. They have bribed a number of our cadres and done many other things. [passage omitted]

During the period 1975-1987, our soldiers and people engaged the enemy a total of 25,348 times, put down 120 uprisings, and drove out a total of 33,792 enemy troops. We wounded 10,515 enemy troops and discovered 3,469 underground forces. We built 9,189 secure villages. We also seized many vehicles and several thousands of tons of war materials. [passage omitted]

Military Faces POL Supply Problems

42060039d Vientiane KONGTHAP PASASON LAO
in Lao 29 Dec 88 p 3

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] As for the fuel oil supply since the beginning of this year, if we focus on the demand of the work the [fuel oil supply] is higher than the work. However, there have been many problems in this regard, as noted in the summary by the chief of the fuel oil department which indicated that of the general problems our nation has had in the past, one was that money could not buy fuel oil. This is because there is a lack of transport vehicles. As a result, the fuel supply cannot circulate and be distributed to meet the needs of the situation. Also, there are limited numbers of cadres with this specialized task, and many other reasons. However, the fuel oil cadres are resolute and have become a driving force in doing everything they can to provide sufficient supplies to the fighting divisions throughout the army as needed. They contact the companies and organizations concerned and borrow supplies from fraternal socialist countries, especially Vietnam. Then they carefully follow regulations on requisitioning and approving the supplies. For circulation and distribution they mobilize the units that have vehicles to transport the supplies to all directions on a continuing basis. They have guaranteed against leakage caused by lack of responsibility. As a result, there is fuel oil throughout the army. Also, in the heavy equipment and important units there is spare fuel oil of at least 10,000 liters, with the most being 600,000 liters. In terms of cooperation with fraternal socialist countries such as Vietnam and the USSR, we have been able to obtain effective assistance including working with the USSR to successfully construct two fuel oil reservoirs and an oil pipeline at Km 20 in Bolikhamsai Province as planned, and working with Vietnam on the survey and design for constructing a warehouse, repairing and constructing oil pipes, and other projects. [passage omitted]

The fuel oil unit must work harder to improve certain problems, such as in contacts with companies and organizations concerned, and with regard to the regulations for acquisition and approval in which they are not as strict as they should be. Basically the statistics collected in each department are not yet sufficiently adequate, and there are accounts and figures that do not balance. In cooperating with foreign countries they are still unable to collect the correct data and carry out proper agreements.

Their preparation for service materials and equipment is not adequate and not in line with the agreement. Part of their construction has been dragging on because of the lack of money and construction materials, and as a result there is low cooperation on their part.

Editorial Assails Poor Army Discipline

42060029a Vientiane KONGTHAP PASASON LAO
in Lao 8 Dec 88 pp 1, 4

[Editorial: "Preserving and Increasing Solidarity Between the Military and the People"]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] Unfortunately, last year there was a lack of solidarity. In some places, various incidents occurred, and these need to be given attention.

As for the social incidents that have occurred, a number of cadres and soldiers who are still young and who do not yet have a real revolutionary spirit have committed disciplinary violations. In particular, they have violated the regulations concerning relations with the people.

Not only have people committed disciplinary violations because of a lack of self-discipline and a lack of class consciousness, what is important is that they have also committed violations like feudal officials. They have acted in an arrogant manner and stolen the property of the people and state.

These incidents have weakened the relationship between the military and the people. That is, the people's confidence in the military has been shaken. In the struggle against America for national liberation, the people placed their property and children in the care of the soldiers when they had to flee. Or when traveling by vehicle or boat, if they were accompanied by soldiers, the people felt safe and knew that they could rely on the soldiers. But today, the people are concerned. That is, cadres and soldiers are committing disciplinary infractions. We must find out the reasons for this.

As for why such evil incidents are occurring today, one of the important reasons is that at a time when society and the military are facing various difficulties, many units are failing to hold training seminars for the men in the unit. The cadres and soldiers are not making a great effort to solve the problems or oppose disciplinary infractions. [passage omitted]

Tax Collection in Proportion to Crop Losses

42060035c Vientiane PASASON in Lao
18 Jan 89 pp 1, 2

[Editorial: "Correctly Implementing the Agricultural Tax Collection Policy"]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] Reports have stated that several districts and provinces in the south and north, such as Louang Namtha, Oudomsai, and Saravane provinces and some districts in Vientiane, Khammouan, and

Savannakhet provinces, have basically completed collecting the agricultural tax. This shows that the farmers are aware of and ready to fulfill their obligations to the state. Several districts and provinces are taking steps to get those who have not yet paid their taxes to do so. Concerning this problem, we have to understand the background of the agricultural tax policy and Council of Ministers Resolution No 9 on the state's tax policy and farmland designated for households each year. This is the origin of the agricultural tax policy. This year, the collection of the agricultural tax is based on the area and type of field. The tax is not collected on a per capita basis. Thus, if a locality does not measure the fields in time or the people protest that the fields were measured incorrectly, we must allow the people in that village to reach an agreement among themselves. After that, a document must be prepared stipulating the type of field. If the people have already paid the tax and it is determined that the tax was incorrect, we must hold a meeting with the people there to correct this. This must be done in order to ensure that the proper amount of agricultural tax is collected.

Another problem that needs to be given attention is that we must adhere to the policy of waiving the tax for fields that do not grow rice or rice fields that have been transplanted but damaged by natural disasters or wild animals. If losses total between 21-70 percent, the agricultural tax will be waived based on the percentage of the field damaged. That is, if 21 percent of a field has been damaged, 21 percent of the agricultural tax will be waived. If 50 percent has been damaged, 50 percent of the tax will be waived. If more than 70 percent of a field has been damaged, the entire agricultural tax will be waived. The purpose of this is to ensure that the lines and policies of the party and state are in accord with the actual situation in each locality. People must not collect the tax in an arbitrary manner. There must be solidarity, and the people's collective ownership rights must be ensured. [passage omitted]

Savannakhet Private Enterprise Gets Blame for Shortcomings

42060035d Vientiane PASASON in Lao 14 Jan 89 p 2

[Article by Phu Attama: "Joint Public-Private Enterprises in Savannakhet Province"]

[Text] Savannakhet Province is different from other provinces in the country. This is because this province is a transit point for goods to and from provinces in the central and southern regions of the country. Goods flow through this province to and from capitalist countries to the west and to capitalist countries in the east along Highway 9.

Today, there are 27 state enterprises in Savannakhet Province. Twenty of these enterprises have switched to carrying on socialist business practices. Two of the companies are carrying on operations in cooperation with other countries. There are 33 joint public-private import-export companies.

Savannakhet's third summary conference on transforming business, which was held at the beginning of October 1988, noted the business activities of the joint public-private enterprises in the province, which are playing a role in developing the province's economy. In particular, efforts have been focused on developing five economic sectors.

Those at the conference cited examples of enterprises that have increased their business profits and partnership profits. For example, during the first 6 months of 1988, Enterprise 17 made a business profit of 7.1 million kip and a partnership profit of 14,800 kip per share. That is more than 300,000 kip per worker. The highest paid employee earned 15,000 kip, and the lowest paid worker earned 7,000 kip per month. Enterprise 1B made a business profit of 8.6 million kip and a partnership profit of 95,871 kip per share. The highest paid employee earned 15,000 kip, and the lowest paid worker earned 5,000 kip. The Food Enterprise made a business profit of 7.1 million kip and a partnership profit of 4,300 kip per share. The highest salary was 35,000 kip, and the lowest was 15,000 kip per month. Enterprise 2 made a business profit of 1 million kip and a partnership profit of 72,454 kip per share. Other enterprises also earned good profits.

But during this period, many of the joint public-private companies in Savannakhet Province experienced various problems. In carrying on import-export activities, some of these companies failed to carry out the political tasks stipulated by the party. Few companies, for example, exported goods. Instead, they focused their attention on importing goods. Moreover, little money was invested in producing goods for export. Most domestic investment was focused on producing timber for export. A number of enterprises were established in order to serve as "middlemen" for people not engaged in import-export activities so that they could earn a percentage. These things have led to other phenomena that are contrary to socialist business regulations, that is, the country's laws. The import-export taxes collected have not been in accord with the volume of goods. For example, 5 tons of iron were exported, but on the tax certificate, the amount was recorded as 2 tons. Another example is that when scrap iron is exported, the tax certificate states that scrap iron is being exported, but actually, gold is concealed beneath the iron and smuggled abroad. When goods are imported, prices and quantities are falsified. The exact amounts brought in are not reported. Besides this, business activities are carried on in an exploitive manner. A number of companies refuse to allow people to buy shares. They allow only wealthy people or relatives to buy shares. Another problem is that some of the joint public-private enterprises refuse to allow state cadres to work there. Or if they do allow them to work there, they assign them tasks other than those stipulated by the state. These problems show that the party's resolutions have not been adhered to closely. These companies don't want to cooperate with state organizations. They are still opportunists. This is

contrary to Resolution 5 and the 11 resolutions of the Council of Ministers. This will have an adverse effect on social life.

Export, Import Firm Reduces Imported Items
42060037d Vientiane PASASON in Lao 30 Jan 89 p 1

[Unattributed report: "The Lao Export-Import Company Shipped More Than 4.6 Billion Kip of Goods"]

[Text] According to a report of the director of the Law Export-Import Company, in 1988 the company was able to ship goods worth more than 4.6 billion kip. This was an increase of more than 3 billion kip over 1987.

The director said that the company had reduced prices appropriately for many of the goods, for example cloth and a number of utensils. In addition company officials worked to correct the problem of goods which had remained in warehouses from past years: goods from 1985 worth more than 280 million kip had remained in warehouses, but by the end of 1988 only 6.81 percent remained; goods from 1986 worth 422 million kip had remained in warehouses, but this has now been taken care of and only 6.84 percent remains; and goods from 1987 worth more than 562 million kip had remained in warehouses, but the company has cleared this up except for 15.4 percent. This has been a victory which the Lao Export-Import Company has achieved during the period of the new system of business administration in our country.

In 1989 the company will ship goods worth 3.7 billion kip. This will be a reduction from 1988 because the company reduced the variety of non-essential imports—in the past the company imported 1,075 items, but now this has been reduced to 300 items. In addition the company intends to cooperate with foreign companies in order to invest in production within our country.

\$10 Million Asia Development Bank Loan
42060037a Vientiane PASASON in Lao 2 Feb 89 p 1

[Unattributed report: "Mr Sali Vongkhamsoo Received Representatives of the Asia Development Bank"]

[Text] In the afternoon of 1 February Mr Sali Vongkhamsoo, Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Minister of the Economy, Planning and Finance, received representatives of the Asia Development Bank led by Mr Morita, Deputy Director of the Planning Department of the Asia Development Bank.

On this occasion the guests and the host discussed general problems in relations between the government of the LPDR (Lao People's Democratic Republic) and the Asia Development Bank. In particular they discussed a \$20 million loan to support our country's agricultural development plan for 1989 and 1990.

Mr Morita told Deputy Chairman Sali Vongkhamsoo that the bank and its member countries approved of and supported the new Lao economic system.

Minister Faults Trade Sector on Purchases
42060037f Vientiane PASASON in Lao 28 Jan 89 p 2

[Problems To Solve column, unattributed: "Improving the Purchases of Goods for the People"]

[Text] In 1988 trade was very vigorous. Progress was made in this battlefield as was demonstrated by the increase in the volume of trade in our country, by the expansion of the distribution of goods into the countryside and mountains, and by the increase in goods from the countryside reaching the towns. This caused production to take another step forward. In the area of the central authority's trade alone, the value of exports during 8 months of 1988 reached more than 9 billion kip, which was 165 percent of the same period in 1987. The policy of free and legal trade accomplished these gains.

In general there has been a great deal of progress, but demand is still not what it should be, especially in the area of state trade. Even though there have been many changes, many problems remain for us to solve. For example the methods and standards used in purchasing and selling goods should be made to conform to the new policies and system. In 1988 state trade was not able to fulfill its plan in many areas especially in requisitioning goods from the people, where only 61 percent of the plan was accomplished.

There were many reasons requisitioning did not reach its goal, but the principle reasons can be summarized as follows: requisitioning was still apt to be done according to the old thinking which meant that the new policies and system had not been absorbed. As Mr Loi Chansavath, a Deputy Minister of Trade and Foreign Economic Relations told PASASON reporters at the end of December 1988: "...the principle enterprises affiliated with the ministry and its various branches were still not skilled at requisitioning goods from the masses. It was still done according to the old thinking; they were apt to requisition at low prices from the masses, and they did not follow the plan in requisitioning because of the lack of cash. But it would be wrong to blame the bank or other sectors for this problem. The reason for the problem was that although the principle state enterprises, especially the enterprises affiliated with this ministry, had abundant goods, the exchange of these goods for money to use for further requisitioning from the masses was not done well. This was shown by the large amounts of items in warehouses. The third reason for the inability to requisition items from the people was that the goods brought for sale to the people did not appeal to them."

In order to make requisitioning from the people more effective in 1989, state trade officials must improve their methods; they must set prices which are agreeable for

purchaser and seller, and they must abolish the old thinking under which they are apt to rely only on authority and administrative procedure. In addition they must master the problem of the lack of cash and not wait for another sector or the bank to solve this problem. And they must grasp the demand and preferences of the people in each period and season so that goods can be distributed quickly and the return can be great etc.

Bank Receives Grant To Train Cadres

42060037g *Vientiane PASASON in Lao 27 Jan 89 p 1*

[Unattributed report: "The Asia Development Bank Provided a Grant of More Than \$700,000 to the Bank of Laos"]

[Text] Recently the Asia Development Bank, which has its headquarters in Manila, the Philippines, agreed to provide the Bank of Laos with a grant of \$790,000.

This money was to be used to create technical cadres for and raise the level of the technical cadres at the Bank of Laos so that they would have more mastery of their work and in order to be able to expand the bank's network within the country.

Vientiane-Louang Namtha Air Service

42060037i *Vientiane PASASON in Lao 27 Jan 89 p 2*

[Unattributed report: "New Air Service Opened Between Vientiane and Louang Namtha"]

[Text] The new air service between Vientiane and Louang Namtha via Louang Prabang was officially opened on 25 January 1989. During the ceremony held that afternoon at the offices of the party committee and administrative committee of Louang Namtha Province, Mr Thongsai Phosai, a member of the political committee of the Civil Aviation Department affiliated with the Ministry of Defense, said that opening this air service was necessary and would make it more convenient for the people, cadres, the military, and police to travel between the provinces of the North and the central region for visits and work.

Normal air service was scheduled for Wednesday and Friday of every week.

Vientiane Capital Census Report

42060038a *Vientiane VIENTIANE MAI in Lao 17 Jan 89 pp 1,6*

[Article: "Female Birthrate Exceeded Male by 1.08 Percent in Vientiane Capital Last Year"]

[Text] The primary birthrate statistic for Vientiane Capital for 1988 indicates that the birthrate for females exceeded that for males by about 1.08 percent. According to last year's birthrate statistics there are approximately 14,769 newborn babies in Vientiane Capital, of

which only 7,084 are boys. The mortality rate is 4,656 which is only 3.17 percent, and this indicates that the people's lives in the capital have been steadily improved.

Based on unofficial statistics, last year the population of Vientiane increased by 47,600 people and the number of families increased by 2.19 percent. The total population is 433,290 of which 27644 are male, which is 55,881 more than the census for 1 March 1985. The increase in the population of the capital has come about for two main reasons, in migration from other areas, and the birthrate within the capital itself. As a result, there are now 63,717 families and 3,357 more houses than in 1987. There are 67,438 families, 8 districts, 49 cantons and 414 villages.

Bolikhamxai Security Official Comments on Subversion

42060035b *Vientiane PASASON in Lao 19 Jan 89 p 2*

[Article by Phuvan Thammasit: "Security Work in Bolikhamxai Province"]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] Mr Khamman Kounchantha, a public security official in Bolikhamxai Province, said that in 1988, Bolikhamxai Province experienced several problems, the most important of which were the subversive activities carried on by the enemy. The enemy carried on various subversive activities, including trying to disrupt communications between Laos, Vietnam, and Cambodia. They spread false propaganda about the correct international line of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party. Besides this, they also tried to tarnish the reputations of leaders at all echelons. They distributed leaflets in Tha Pabat, Pak San, and Pak Kating districts. In some remote areas, they carried on such subversive activities in order to destroy the solidarity of the hill tribes. They have used the difficulties encountered in the revolution and the weaknesses of the units and organizations to distort things and cause trouble between the people and the cadres. They have tried to weaken the people's confidence in the policies and activities of the party and state. They have tried to persuade youths not to carry out their duties in defending the country and maintaining peace.

The enemy has also implemented a policy of involving themselves in the religious activities of the party and state in an effort to carry on psychological warfare operations. Their objective is to distort the lines and policies of the party and state. They have used the problems facing the people to win over people with low political awareness to their side. They have used people's personal problems in an effort to spread propaganda and persuade these people to join them. They have also tried to bribe cadres, soldiers, students, and other young people.

Because of this, the Public Security Service has implemented a plan to send officials to the bases. [passage omitted] In 1988, 39 cadres were sent to the bases. The

cadres, state employees, and people in the municipalities were registered and issued I.D. cards. The province discovered 12 enemies in various localities who were hiding among the people. Guerrilla and local forces were used to carry out eight operations, in which six of the enemy were killed. In cooperation with tax officials, they carried out operations against merchants who were carrying on illegal activities and seized illegal goods worth 465,000 kip.

Activities have been carried on in order to restore peace and improve things in various localities. The provincial Public Security Service has implemented a plan to station forces in various municipalities. Security officials will be assigned to the important organizations to provide strong security. [passage omitted]

Extractive Industry Sector Problems, Production Declines

42060038c Vientiane PASASON in Lao 9 Feb 89 p 2

[Article: "Some Work Experiences in Industry in 1988"]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] With particular regard to the main production units under the Ministry of Industry and Manufacturing, in the past year they were able to achieve an industrial production value of 8,805,569,000 kip or 56.53 percent of the plan, an increase of 89.64 percent over that for 1987. [passage omitted]

In the meantime, many enterprises are still facing problems in business production, such as the Lao Electrification Company which produced 520,599,000 kWh of electricity last year, which was 27.36 percent less than the first year plan and 8.12 percent less than that for 1987. The reason for this reduction was that the rainfall capacity in the Nam Ngum reservoir was less than that of previous years.

The year's production for tin was 410,020 sheets, which was 23.31 percent of the plan and 42.76 percent of that in 1987. This was because of delays in the arrivals of raw materials ordered from abroad.

The total production of the cable and plastic bag factory was 174,318,000 kip, which was 32.76 percent less than the year plan and 24.64 percent less than that in 1987. This was because of a problem in the supply of raw materials from abroad, as well as price increases for raw materials on the international market, which resulted in high production costs.

The powder detergent factory produced 1,534 tons last year, or 61.36 percent of the plan. The reason was because the market was not expanding, resulting in a backlog of many products and thus a production stoppage for 3-4 months.

The production machinery in the tin mining factory was in poor condition, thus not being able to operate at their full capacity. Also, because there were no spare parts to

operate the machinery the industrial production had to be halted in May 1988. The factory has now resumed its manufacturing production by mobilizing labor from its workers and the people. In this way the factory is able to make purchases and engage in further manufacturing. The total tin production in 1988 was 245.9 tons, which was 27.2 percent of the early annual plan. The manufacturing production of the people alone was 206 tons, or 108 percent of the early annual plan.

Gypsum mining production throughout 1988 was only 80,000 tons, or 66.66 percent of the plan, because the production vehicles broke down and worked approximately 40 percent of the time.

There were also difficulties in coal mining because of broken-down vehicles and a shortage of spare parts, and there was only 45 days of production. Throughout the year the coal production was only 461 tons, or 16.03 percent of the plan.

The Houaisai tin mine had to stop production throughout the year because it had no production vehicles.

The total distribution of goods throughout the year was 10,874,221,000 kip, including \$11,393,000 of foreign currency. The goods distribution in kip was 65.19 percent of the plan, a 20.84 percent increase in comparison with that in 1987.

In conclusion, the distribution of items was good. However, problems remain in pricing certain products with a single price that is not suitable for the actual market situation. Some products were priced higher than the market. This was because of the demand for cash. And some products were purchased with transferred money and then sold for cash at a lower price, such as powdered detergent, tin, and agricultural tools.

The economic commitment on the part of the customers has not yet been strictly carried out. There have been instances where some foreign products have won out in our domestic market.

We have learned some lessons from last year's experience. For example [passage omitted], we must set out in detail the types of treasury obligations, such as whether they are one-priced obligations or contract types. This is to ensure that the national budget is balanced. We must follow the market to supply and distribute goods domestically and abroad. We must dare to make the decision to use modern techniques and technology to boost work efficiency. We must study and promulgate different policies and rules as tools for administrative management.

Editor Discusses Permission for Thai Film Shows
42060038d *Vientiane PASASON in Lao* 4 Feb 89 p 2

["Problems That Need To Be Solved" column]

[Text] In mid-January 1989 Vienthan, an army youth who is interested in the state film unit which showed Thai films in the Thai language in Ban Chommani, Vientiane Capital, on the night of 16 January 1989, has asked PASASON whether the film showing was proper.

The PASASON editorial staff feel that this is a very good question. We apologize for the late answer, and would like to divide the question into two parts, as follows.

Is it proper to propagate foreign culture among the people by different means, especially by showing films? This is suitable, necessary, and correct. However, the movies must be censored first to see what they are about. If they are useful, then they can be shown to the people. On the other hand, if the movies are poisonous or harmful to the people they must be gotten rid of immediately. This is because our new socialist cultural foundation was established on Marxism-Leninism and on a socialist collective spirit. It continues and promotes our fine national heritage and culture. At the same time, it passes on selective culture, modern scientific achievements, and the fruits of human civilization.

Foreign films that are shown in Laos definitely must be in the Lao language because the purpose is not only for the viewers to understand but also to show respect for the independence of our country. However, why is there the problem that Vienthan is concerned with? Our editorial staff has discussed this matter with Mr Nousai Phoummachan, assistant chief of the State Movie Company under the Ministry of Education, Culture, and

Sport. He explained that the Lao script is sent along with movies for each movie showing, but some movies are still in Thai as Vienthan himself has seen because sometimes there are problems (especially on the part of those who speak the dialog). Also, the reason is that the responsibility of the movie unit is not yet sufficiently well developed, etc. The movie committee and other work sections concerned are working on solving this problem.

Our editorial staff would like to thank Vienthan for giving us an opportunity to respond to his concern.

Expatriates Sign Factory Partnership Deal
42060038b *Vientiane VIENTIANE MAI in Lao*
16 Jan 88 pp 1,6

[Article: "An Agreement Is Signed To Establish a Clothing Industry Factory"]

[Text] On the evening of 14 January a ceremony was held at the restaurant of the Nongbaothong Co-op to sign a clothing factory partnership agreement between the cotton spinning factory and the tailoring factory in Sikottabong District, Vientiane Capital, and Lao who reside in France. The agreement was signed by Mr Sisouphan Sengmani, chief of the factory, and Mr Sophi Nousai amidst Mr Sisavat Thavitham, party secretary and also Sikottabong District administrative committee chairman, and a number of cadres concerned. The agreement contained six articles which stated the mutual responsibilities for organizing and managing the production and labor administration, and also the market survey for distributing goods at home and abroad. The joint investment for setting up the factory is over \$372,000. This agreement is valid for 10 years starting the day of production.

Chawalit on PRC Aid, Hun Sen, U.S. Reactions
42070067 Bangkok SIAM RAT SAPDA WICHAN
in Thai 5-11 Feb 89 pp 19-21

[Interview with Gen Chawalit Yongchaiyut, the RTA CINC and supreme commander, on 24 January 1989; place not specified]

[Excerpts] [Question] What topics did you discuss with Qin Jiwei (the Chinese minister of defense)?

[Answer] That was an ordinary official visit. We didn't discuss anything special. It was just a normal meeting to chat about various matters. Let me give you the highlights. We talked about many things, but there wasn't anything of particular importance. We informed him once again about the purpose of our previous trip to China and the proposal of an agreement between the Thai and Chinese militaries. We informed him of these things once again. He already knew most of this, but we wanted to tell him once more.

Regarding this agreement, we asked him to accept in principle the idea that one of the roles and missions of our two militaries is to help develop the country. He asked about this when we visited China. He wondered about this and said that he had never heard anything like that before. We said that if we could reach an agreement on this, our two militaries could share things and exchange experiences. We could exchange views and help each other in order to develop our countries. That was the first point of importance. Something even more important was that we wanted to show the world that our two militaries are there to help develop things and not to carry on military activities or to establish arms depots or to buy weapons and cause problems for other countries. This was one of our important objectives. We raised this issue once again. He said that he understood this and that action is being taken on this. As for how we can help each other, they have taken immediate action. Much has been done. They have informed the companies that are involved in developing water sources. They have a lot of experience. We are very interested. In the northeast, for example, we need another 50-60,000 wells. Every unit can work together. Each unit can dig only 3-4,000 wells. We can't go on like this for another 10 years when they have very capable people available. They have already sent some. They have already taken action.

With respect to the military, they have begun looking at the equipment, particularly light tools, shovels, crow-bars, hammers, axes, and so on. They are also considering helping us with heavy equipment. We are involved in a large number of development projects, as is well known. This includes the Green Northeast project, the Pak Phanang project, and the projects in the five southern provinces. We discussed these projects with them.

As for the issues that they raised with us, there was one issue that was particularly important. That is, they confirmed that relations between our two countries or between

our two militaries or peoples, will continue like this regardless of whether or not the conflict in Cambodia is resolved. Regardless of the situation or what conflicts arise in this region, we will continue to be friends. Our relationship will continue to improve. This is very significant. These are the matters that we discussed.

[Question] Did you discuss the matter of China providing support to the Khmer Rouge?

[Answer] We didn't discuss that in any detail. We discussed what is likely to happen. Both sides agreed that the situation will probably continue to improve. But it will still be a long time before real peace is restored to Cambodia. It will not be easy to achieve real peace. We all know this and so it wasn't necessary to explain things in detail. They refer to this as external and internal problems.

What are the important external problems? With respect to Cambodia, one of the important external problems is the withdrawal of the Vietnamese forces. Another is halting or reducing the support given by other countries or reducing outside interference in Cambodia. These are external problems. The external problems can be resolved easily, because that is the reality. Thus, they can be solved easily.

The most important problems are the internal problems. What are these problems? These have to do with reaching an agreement within Cambodia. What are the conflicts today? One is how to establish a government of reconciliation that is unified and that can rebuild the country. There is still disagreement over this. Some people say that the PRK (People's Republic of Kampuchea) and everything else must be down away with and replaced by a new administrative organization. The Hun Sen faction has said that it can't accept that. There would be a vacuum. But the others say that if the existing organizations aren't eliminated, they will have influence over future elections. There is still disagreement on this. This has to do with the structure of the Cambodian government. This is an internal problem.

Another important problem has to do with guarantees, guarantees that will allow the situation in Cambodia to unfold in accord with the wishes of the Cambodian people and people throughout the world who want Cambodia to be a neutral and nonaligned country at peace. Other countries do not want it to be a communist country. Few Cambodians are communists. That is the hope, but there are still conflicts. As for what apparatus can be used, Heng Samrin, that is, the PRK, says that it wants the ICC (International Commission of Cambodia). Another faction wants an IPKF (International Peacekeeping Force). A third faction wants both. Others say that anything is all right. They are still arguing over this. The external problems are easy. It's the internal problems that will be difficult to solve.

A third problem in which everyone is interested is whether the Khmer Rouge will return to power. We must make a clear distinction. The Khmer Rouge are Cambodians. Thus, when we say "Khmer Rouge," we are talking about Cambodians. We can't simply ignore the million Cambodians who were under the control of the Khmer Rouge government when it was in power. If we do, the conflict in Cambodia will continue. Everyone agrees that there are certain people, certain leaders, who are unacceptable. The rest can be accepted. There is still disagreement on this. Thus, in trying to solve the Cambodia problem, the focus should be on the internal problems. But don't forget that the internal problems are not our problems. They are Cambodia's problems. It's Cambodia that must solve these problems. All we can do is try to help them reach an agreement. Do you understand?

[Question] What do you think about the 5-point peace proposal made by Prince Sihanouk at the Paris meeting?

[Answer] As I have said, these are internal problems. I don't want to say very much about this. Prince Sihanouk has much prestige. He has much experience and is a leader. He is accepted by the world, or UN. He is a leader who is accepted by the Cambodian people. Even Hun Sen accepts him. Let him be the leader. I am sure that he has reasons for his proposals. Prince Sihanouk is now taking a much softer position. He is prepared to do whatever is necessary to bring peace and happiness to his country and people. I am sure that he has his own reasons. But I would rather not comment on this.

[Question] Thailand's position seems to have changed, and the prime minister met with Mr Hun Sen. What do you think about this? [passage omitted]

[Answer] An important point is that they asked for this. He said that they were welcome to come. He had to issue the invitation. He was acting like a statesman. Second, he came as the head of one of the Cambodian factions. This was not a matter of recognizing him as prime minister. It wasn't anything like that. Do you understand? This is a very important point.

But even more important is that the world community, including the ASEAN countries, who are our allies, Europe, the United States, and Japan, must be kept informed about what is being done. Everyone must agree. They have all been informed. Thailand has not been "offside" or gone out in front. As I said above, their internal problems are not our business.

[Question] Some scholars such as Khian Thirawit have said that we should apologize to the United States, Japan, and other countries for in effect betraying them.

[Answer] (laughs) He is a very nice person. He is a good person. He is a very patriotic person. I have known him for a long time. But it should be remembered that Thailand and other countries cooperate with each other

because of shared principles. Do you understand? The prime minister is acting on the basis of these principles. He is not trying to keep things secret from anyone. We have kept others informed. Right? Thus, we haven't hurt anyone. We cooperate with each other on the basis of shared principles. One of those principles is that we oppose armed aggression by one country against another country. We subscribe to the principle of self-determination for the people of a country. We side with others on the basis of principles, not personalities. You should remember that. There is a feeling of being allies.

Thus, what Achan Khian said is right. He was speaking in a particular sense. Before the prime minister took this step, he told others what he planned to do. He went to Indonesia. I had an opportunity to tell people that he was planning to come talk with them about this. He talked with them about this. But when we talk with others, we don't say that we will do this or that. If it is an internal matter, we have to say that it is an internal matter of theirs and that they must handle it themselves. But if they ask our opinion, we will give our opinion. This is very important. This is a very important point. The world will see Thailand's position.

[Question] The United States has criticized Thailand, saying that it can't keep up with our foreign policy. What do you think about this?

[Answer] (laughs) I went and played golf with Dan O'Donohue (the American ambassador to Thailand). He said that this was the best reason. From now on, we won't joke like this with anyone. That isn't a problem. That has never been a problem. The United States is most concerned about the human rights issue. Thailand and the United States have been friends for a very long time. Thus, we can apologize to each other. We understand each other. If there is a problem, we can talk to each other. We have been allies for a long time. It's absurd to think that we would misunderstand each other over a minor point. They were joking. I like to joke, too. When we played golf, he asked me, "Where is Hun Sen?" I said, "In the U.S. embassy." (laughs) We joke like that. But we won't joke like that any more. Actually, there is no problem. He has a sense of humor. He is a very good friend. We are very close. Thus, he wouldn't do anything like that. Please remember that. As for the military aid or program cuts, he said that it wasn't him. When Senator Lugar and Congressman Leed visited Thailand, I met with them. I also know Admiral Adisti, the head of CIMPAC, quite well. Everyone is working together in order to increase the level of aid to more than \$40 million. It's now about \$20 million. We want to increase it about \$20 million. They are working hard on our behalf. Thus, there aren't any problems. We didn't know anything about this. It's a good chance to ask.

[Question] Have they shown any displeasure about the fact that we have drawn closer to China?

[Answer] No. How could they be displeased? They have gone even farther than we have. How could they be displeased? Carlusi went to China. The Thai prime minister hasn't gone yet. I am just giving you the facts. They have reached a number of trade agreements. How could they criticize us? They haven't criticized us. I talked with the congressmen who visited Thailand. One of the members of the delegation said that Thailand shouldn't have any doubts about that.

There are many things that Thais don't understand. I would like Thais to realize that... particularly the army. I can speak on behalf of the army, because I am the commander. Our position is fair. We will not do anything to cause problems. People criticized me for going to Burma and China even though my intentions were pure. I went in an effort to help the world. But people didn't see that. But that doesn't matter. [passage omitted].

Government Assists USSR Earthquake Victims
BK2403071089 Bangkok Domestic Service in Thai
0530 GMT 24 Mar 89

[Text] At the Foreign Ministry this morning, Foreign Minister Air Chief Marshal Sitthi Sawetsila presented to Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy Valkov Thailand's relief assistance to the Soviet people in Armenia who have suffered from an earthquake.

The assistance—worth 2,200,000 baht—given by the Thai Government to the Armenian people consists of 1,265 boxes of canned sardines, 6,111 boxes of biscuits, 1,485 blankets, and medical equipment.

Thailand's assistance to the Soviet Union, apart from showing sympathy to a country affected by a natural disaster, will also strengthen relations between the two countries.

Opinion Poll on Foreign, Domestic Policy; Personalities
42070066 Bangkok SIAM RAT SAPDA WICHAN
in Thai 5-11 Feb 89 pp 9-13

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] The Institute of Social Research, Chulalongkorn University, conducted a public opinion poll on the Chatchai administration and Thai society today. The poll was conducted during the period 10 December 1988 to 10 January 1989. The purpose was to obtain people's ideas on today's living conditions and find out what people think about this administration and whether they are satisfied with the things that it has done.

The poll was conducted in Bangkok Metropolitan and its suburbs and in certain large provinces such as Nakhon Sawan, Chiang Mai, and Khon Kaen. This was done in order to have a broader sample. The sample was composed of eight major groups: government officials and state enterprise employees, teachers and instructors,

merchants and businessmen, employees at private companies, self-employed people, farmers, laborers and hawkers, and students. The sample was composed of a total of 2,603 respondents. [passage omitted]

The Problems About Which the People Are Most Concerned

The problems about which the people were most concerned last year were, in order, insufficient income as compared with expenses, 34.5 percent; unemployment; 18.8 percent; traffic problems, 13.4 percent; decline in morality, 9.8 percent; crime, 9.1 percent; and various other problems such as drought, flooding, and housing.

One point worth noting is that most of the respondents were experiencing problems in earning enough to live on. That is, their expenses exceeded their incomes. In second place was the problem of unemployment, which is a very important problem. However, there was a difference in the opinions of urban dwellers as compared with people living in rural areas. That is, 41.2 percent of the rural respondents said that income was a problem as compared with 32.2 percent of the urban respondents who mentioned this problem. Also, 18.5 percent of the rural respondents said that unemployment was a problem as compared with 18.9 percent of the urban respondents. As for traffic, only 4.9 percent said that this was a problem as compared with 16.3 percent of the urban respondents. With respect to moral decline, 7.3 percent of the rural respondents said that this was a problem as compared with 10.6 percent of the urban respondents.

Corruption Is Still a Major Problem

Respondents were asked: "In your opinion, what are the urgent social problems that the government needs to solve as quickly as possible?" The largest number of respondents, 45.2 percent, said that the most urgent problem today is corruption. This was followed by crime, 24.1 percent; narcotics, 14.4 percent; gambling and illegal lottery activities, 6.4 percent; the price of agricultural produce, 3.0 percent; unemployment, 2.7 percent; and prostitution and massage parlors, 2.6 percent.

As for what the people would like the government to do in 1989, 41.8 percent said that they want the government to take steps to reduce the cost of consumer goods; 30.3 percent that the government should solve the unemployment problem; and 9.9 percent said that the government should take action to help relieve the suffering of the people in the south who have suffered from natural disasters. Others said that the government should increase the minimum wage and raise the salaries of government officials.

Popularity of this administration: Most of the People Felt That This Administration Is the Same as Previous Administrations.

The people were asked: "What do you think about this government?" Based on the responses from the 2,603 respondents, 69.0 percent were not proud of this administration. They felt indifferent and said that this administration is the same as previous administrations. Only 22.7 percent of the respondents said that they were proud of this administration. Another 8.3 percent said that this administration hasn't done anything of which it can be proud. This shows that few people are interested in this administration.

Divided by sex, 26.3 percent of the males said that they were proud of this administration, 64.2 percent said that they were indifferent; and 9.5 percent said that they were not proud of this administration. Of the female respondents, 18.7 percent said that they were very proud of the administration, 74.4 percent said that they were indifferent, and 6.9 percent said that they were not proud of the administration.

Divided by age, 20.1 percent of those 20-30 years old said that they were very proud of the administration, 20.1 percent were indifferent, and 70.4 percent said that they were not proud of the administration. Of those 30-40 years old, 23.2 percent said that they were very proud, 70.1 percent said that they were indifferent, and 6.8 percent said that they were not proud. Of those over 40 years old, 27.5 percent said that they were very proud, 64.7 percent said that they were indifferent, and 7.8 percent said that they were not proud.

Divided by level of education, 24.1 percent of those with a primary level education said that they were very proud, 71.1 percent said that they were indifferent, and 4.9 percent said that they were not proud of the Chatchai administration. Of those with a secondary school education, 22.1 percent said that they were very proud, 69.4 percent said that they were indifferent, and 8.5 percent said that they were not proud. Of those with a bachelor's degree or higher, 21 percent said that they were very proud, 67 percent said that they were indifferent, and 12 percent said that they were not proud of the administration. [passage omitted]

Dislike Because This Administration Is Dominated by Financiers

Of those who did not like this administration, 36.7 percent said that they did not like this administration because the cabinet is composed mostly of financiers who are making unfair use of their power. Another 17.2 percent said that the prime minister is not his own man, 17.2 percent said that the government is doing things too slowly and that it has not scored any achievements, 14.4 percent said that the government does not make decisions resolutely, and 13.5 percent said that the government cannot solve the country's economic problems.

Classifying the reasons of those respondents who were dissatisfied with the administration, 36.7 percent did not like the cabinet, 17.2 percent were unhappy with the prime minister, 32.6 percent were dissatisfied with the work done by the government, and 13.5 percent were dissatisfied with the results achieved by the government.

The People Lack Confidence in the Unity of the Government Coalition

As for cooperation between the various political parties that form the present administration, the majority of the respondents were uncertain about how unified the government coalition is. The poll showed that 37.4 percent of the respondents were uncertain about how well the government parties are cooperating with each other. Another 25.5 percent said that the parties are cooperating well, 17.2 percent said that they are not cooperating very well, and 16.8 percent said that there are constant conflicts. Only 3.1 percent said that the parties are cooperating very well.

Uncertainty About Whether This Administration Will Show Better Form Than the Prem Administration

The Chatchai administration had been in office for 5 months and 2 days as of the last day of this survey (10 January 1989). Comparing this administration with the Prem administration, the poll clearly showed that it is still too early to compare the performance of this administration with that of the previous administration. A total of 77.6 percent of the respondents said that they were uncertain because the administration took office just recently. Of those who did make a comparison, 13.6 percent said that this administration is better than the Prem administration, and 8.8 percent said that it is worse. These are very small percentages as compared with those who are still uncertain. However, in order to make the comparison clearer, the views of the respondents can be divided by sex and residence as follows: [passage omitted]

Divided by present place of residence, 73.3 percent of those living in Bangkok Metropolitan said that they are still uncertain, 15.3 percent said that this government is better, and 11.5 percent said that it is worse than the previous administration. Of those living in the suburbs, 73.9 percent said that they are uncertain, 14.6 percent said that it is better, and 11.6 percent said that it is worse. Of those living in the provinces, 82.3 percent said that they are uncertain, 12.0 percent said that it is better, and 5.7 percent said that it is worse.

This Administration Is Better Than the Prem Administration Because It Can Solve the Economic Problems Better

Of those who felt that this administration is doing a better job than the Prem administration, 25.1 percent said that it is doing a better job because it can solve the economic problems better, 23.1 percent said that it is better because it is more democratic, 22.2 percent said

that it is better because it is more interested in the problems of the people; 13.0 percent said that it makes decisions faster with respect to solving problems; 9.6 percent said that the prime minister is doing a better job; and 7.0 percent said that this administration has greater unity. In short, 42.2 percent of these respondents felt that this administration is better than the previous administration because of its work line, 32.7 percent said that it was better because of the prime minister, and 25.1 percent said that it has achieved better results.

Worse Because of a Lack of Coordination

Of those who felt that this administration is doing a worse job than the Prem administration, 34.9 percent said that it is doing a worse job because the cabinet does not coordinate things well; 22.7 percent said that this administration cannot control prices; 12.7 percent said that there is no clear policy; 10.9 percent said that the prime minister lacks the personality of a leader; 10.5 percent said that this administration has not achieved anything; and 8.3 percent said that it lacks a line for solving the economic problems and reducing the trade deficit. In short, 34.9 percent of these respondents said that this administration is worse for reasons having to do with the cabinet, 32.2 percent said that it is worse because of what it has done, 21.0 percent said that it is worse because of its work line, and 10.9 percent said that it is because of the prime minister.

As for the administration's decision to raise the minimum wage for laborers, 50.8 percent said that the raise was sufficient, 31.5 percent said that the raise was too small, 12.9 percent said that they were uncertain, and 4.8 percent said that the raise was too large.

As for the decision to raise the salaries of state enterprise officials, 41.3 percent said that the government gave them too large an increase, 36.9 percent said that the amount of the raise was about right, 14.8 percent said that they weren't sure, and 7.0 percent said that the raise was too small.

In summary, most of the respondents felt that the raise in the minimum wage for laborers was about right. Only 4.8 percent said that the minimum wage had been raised too high. But in the case of the state enterprise workers, 41.3 percent of the respondents said that their salaries had been increased too much. This shows how the people feel about these decisions. [passage omitted]

Ways To Solve the Economic Problems

There are three main lines for solving the economic problems. A total of 42.0 percent of the respondents felt that the government should have a clearer economic policy. They said that if the administration's policy vacillates, businessmen and industrialists won't dare

invest in various projects, which will make it difficult to develop the country's economy. In particular, this will scare away foreign investors who want to invest in Thailand.

Second, 25.2 percent said that the private sector should have greater freedom in investing. What they meant was that the government should impose fewer restrictions and conditions than at present. Another 22.2 percent said that something must be done about the bureaucracy. In particular, contact with the bureaucracy is very slow, and there is an "under-the-table" system that poses an obstacle. This makes it more difficult to carry on business activities. Others said that to solve the economic problems, things should be allowed to proceed as they are at present. The problems will solve themselves. Some said that all sides must cooperate, and a few said that they did not have any suggestions to make.

Views on the Indochina Policy

As for whether or not the government should have relations with the Indochina countries, that is, Laos, Vietnam, and Cambodia, the respondents proposed only two main lines. More than half of the respondents, 51.8 percent, said that the Thai government should be neutral both politically and economically. That is, Thailand should not interfere politically or economically. Another 39.7 percent said that we should establish trade relations in order to promote trade and improve relations with these countries. As for the remaining respondents, 5.6 percent said that we should not be friends with these countries. Most of these people cited what took place at Ban Rom Klao as an example of why we should not be friends with these countries. Also, 0.9 percent said that we should intervene in order to exert pressure to have these countries, particularly Cambodia and Laos, govern themselves.

Government-Military Relations

There were two main views on government-military relations. That is, 45.5 percent felt that relations between the government and the military are good, and 48.7 percent said that relations are not good. Only 5.8 percent did not express an opinion.

Of those who felt that relations are good, 29.7 percent said that the military is supporting the government's activities. Some added that this is due in part to the fact that the prime minister, that is, Gen Chatchai Chunhavan, also holds the position of minister of defense. Thus, the military is providing good support. Some people said that this is because this government is a democratic government. If the military does not support this government, that will be tantamount to not supporting democracy, and senior military leaders do not want the people to view the military in that light.

Another 15.8 percent of the respondents said that the military accepts this administration. Many people felt that this provides good assurance against a coup. Some said that they hold this view because they have not seen anything or heard any news indicating that there is a conflict between the government and the military. Even though relations may not be as close as during the previous administration, relations are still quite good.

Bad Relations With the Military

As for those who felt that relations were not good, 24.2 percent said that the government does not dare get into a conflict with the military. Some added that the government took office just 5 months ago and that the government doesn't want to get into an argument with the military, which could affect the government's stability.

Another 22.7 percent said that the military wants to help stabilize the government. Many said that this has been the form of relations for a long time. In the past, if the government was headed by a civilian instead of a former military officer, that government usually had little stability and did not stay in power very long. This form of relations shows that the military leads politics. The government cannot create political stability by itself but must rely on the military to provide political stability. Only 1.3 percent of the respondents said that this administration is the puppet of the military, and only 0.5 percent said that the military has conflicts with this administration and is searching for the government's weaknesses in order to intervene. [passage omitted]

Opposition Has Declined

As for the people's views on the role of the opposition, few of the respondents felt that the opposition is playing a good role. That is, 35.1 percent said that the opposition parties are working only in their own interests. Also, 24.6 percent said that the nine opposition parties (the Ruam Thai, Prachakon Thai, Prachachon, Thai Masses, Moral Force, Community Action, Progressive, Liberal, and the Social Democratic Force parties) that have joined together have formed only a loose alliance and that they are cooperating on specific issues and problems only. Another 22.2 percent said that the opposition parties are sincerely trying to monitor the activities of the government. Only 9.1 percent said that the opposition parties are working together closely, and only 9.0 percent said that they are cooperating well in carrying on activities.

Thais Don't Know Who the Ministers Are

The respondents were asked, "Which of the 45 ministers in the cabinet do you like the most?" A total of 28 percent of the respondents said that they aren't interested in the ministers and don't even know who is in the cabinet. Thus, only 72 percent expressed a view on this.

Of those who expressed a view, 13 percent that they did not like anyone in particular or did not like any of the ministers. That left only 59 percent who said that they liked some of the ministers.

Of those who said that they liked particular ministers, 17.7 percent said that they liked Mr Chuan Likphai, the minister of public health. He was followed by Air Chief Marshal Sitthi Sawetsila, the minister of foreign affairs, 9.9 percent; Gen Chatchai Chunhawan, the prime minister and minister of defense, 5.4 percent; Mrs Suphatra Matsadit, the minister attached to the Office of the Prime Minister, 4.3 percent; Mr Phichai Rattakun, the deputy prime minister, and Mr Subin Pinkhayan, the minister of commerce, 2.7 percent; and Mr Pramuan Saphawas, the minister of finance, and Lt Col Sanan Khachonprasat, the minister of agriculture, 2.4 percent. The remaining 11.5 percent of the respondents named various other ministers.

Chuan Likphai Is Well Liked by the People

Divided by place of residence, the three most popular ministers are: Bangkok Metropolitan: 1. Mr Chuan Likphai, 2. ACM Sitthi Sawetsila, and 3. Gen Chatchai Chunhawan. In the suburbs: 1. Mr Chuan, 2. ACM Sitthi, and 3. Mr Phichai Rattakun. In the provinces: 1. Mr Chuan, ACM Sitthi, and 3. Gen Chatchai.

There were no differences of opinion between respondents who lived in a rural area as opposed to those who lived in an urban area. That is, the most popular ministers where, in order, Mr Chuan Likphai, ACM Sitthi Sawetsila, and Gen Chatchai Chunhawan.

Unpopular Ministers

The 2,603 respondents were asked, "Which ministers do you dislike the most?" A total of 28 percent said that they didn't know or were not interested. Another 25.5 percent said that there was no one whom they disliked intensely. That left 46.5 percent who said that there were ministers whom they disliked. Of these, the ministers disliked the most were, in order, Police Cpt Chaloem Yubamrung, the minister attached to the Office of the Prime Minister, 19.9 percent; Mr Banhan Silapa-acha, the minister of industry, 8.6 percent; and Maj Gen Praman Adireksan, the minister of interior, 6.3 percent. The remaining percentages were all very small. That is, 1.7 percent said that they disliked Gen Chatchai Chunhawan, the prime minister and minister of defense; 1.3 percent disliked Mr Trairong Suwannakhiri, the deputy minister of interior; and 1.2 percent did not like Mr Santi Chaiwirattana, the deputy minister of interior, or Mr Pramuan Saphawas, the minister of finance. The remaining 6.5 percent of these respondents named various other ministers.

One point worth noting is that regardless of whether the respondents lived in Bangkok, the suburbs, or in the provinces or whether they lived in a rural or urban

setting, the three most unpopular ministers were, in order, Police Cpt Chaloe Yubamrung, the minister attached to the Office of the Prime Minister, Mr Banhan Silapa-acha, the minister of industry, and Maj Gen Praman Adireksan, the minister of interior. [passage omitted]

The Ministers Who Are Most Concerned About Their Friends

As for which ministers are most concerned about the interests of their friends, 28.8 percent of the respondents said that they didn't know or were not interested. A total of 33.3 percent said that none of the ministers was overly concerned about the interests of his or her friends. That left 37.9 percent who said that various ministers were very concerned about the interests of their friends. Those mentioned most frequently were, in order, Police Cpt Chaloe Yubamrung, 12.8 percent; Mr Banhan Silapa-acha, 10.0 percent; and Maj Gen Praman Adireksan, 6.1 percent. Some respondents mentioned Gen Chatchai, ACM Sitthi, Mr Phichai Rattakun, and Mr Trairong Suwannakhiri. Another 2.2 percent mentioned various other ministers.

When divided by place of residence, the order of those viewed as being very concerned with the interests of their friends was as follows: In Bangkok Metropolitan: 1. Police Cpt Chaloe Yubamrung, 2. Mr Banhan Silapa-acha, and 3. Maj Gen Praman Adireksan. In the suburbs: 1. Police Cpt Chaloe, 2. Mr Banhan, and 3. Maj Gen Praman. In the provinces: 1. Mr Banhan, 2. Maj Gen Praman, and 3. Police Cpt Chaloe.

Among respondents who lived in rural areas, the order was: 1. Mr Banhan, 2. Maj Gen Praman, and 3. Police Cpt Chaloe. Among urban respondents, the order was: 1. Police Cpt Chaloe, 2. Mr Banhan, and 3. Maj Gen Praman.

This poll showed that people view the ministers both positively and negatively. An interesting point is that 20-28.8 percent of the respondents said that they did not know or were not interested in this. This shows that about 28 percent of the respondents were not interested in politics (relating to the government). Also, 13.0-33.3 percent did not mention the names of any ministers. Of those who did not mention any names or who said that there weren't any such ministers, many said that they did not mention any names because they really didn't know who is in the cabinet. They didn't even know how many ministers there are. The fact that people could not respond to these questions does not mean that they were not interested in politics. They may not have received enough information on what the ministers are like. Some of those mentioned were mentioned because they are well-known people or their names have been in the news frequently. All of this indicates that the people have not received much information about the work of the ministers serving in this administration.

Thus, the results of the poll on the image of the ministers serving in this administration are based on the views of only about half of those sampled. Summarizing the views of these people, the three most popular ministers were, in order, Mr Chuan Likphai, ACM Sitthi Sawetsila, and Mrs Suphatra Matsadit. The three most unpopular ministers were, in order, Police Cpt Chaloe Yubamrung, Mr Banhan Silapa-acha, and Maj Gen Praman Adireksan.

Moral Force Party Still Popular

When asked about the political parties, 22.3 percent of the respondents said that they didn't know about or were not interested in this. Only 8.3 percent said that they didn't have any preference. The remaining 69.4 percent named the parties that they liked.

The most popular political party was the Moral Force Party, which was mentioned by 17.5 percent of the respondents. This was followed by the Prachakon Thai Party, 14.7 percent, the Democrat Party, 12.3 percent, the Social Action Party, 8.5 percent, the Thai Nation Party, 6.2 percent, the Thai Masses Party, 6.0 percent, and various other parties, 4.3 percent. But after analyzing these statistics more carefully, it was found that there were significant differences when divided by location, occupation, and level of education.

Divided by Present Place of Residence

Bangkok Metropolitan: The most popular political parties were, in order, the Prachakon Thai Party, 27.3 percent; the Moral Force Party, 20.3 percent; and the Democrat Party, 19.9 percent. Suburbs: The Prachakon Thai Party, 25.3 percent; the Democrat Party, 21.4 percent; and the Moral Force Party, 17.5 percent. The respondents in Nakhon Sawan Province said that their favorite parties were: the Moral Force Party, 23.6 percent; the Prachakon Thai Party, 13.4 percent; and the Thai Masses Party, 11.8 percent. The respondents in Chiang Mai Province responded as follows: the Moral Force Party, 38.9 percent; the Social Action Party, 21.3 percent; and the Democrat Party, 11.7 percent. In the Khon Kaen Province, the responses were: the Thai Masses Party, 28.1 percent; the Moral Force Party, 12.6 percent; and the Democrat and Social Action parties, each with 11.2 percent.

The most popular parties divided by occupation: Among government officials and state enterprise employees, the most popular parties were, in order, the Prachakon Thai Party, 24.4 percent; the Moral Force Party, 20.5 percent; and the Democrat Party, 13.7 percent. Among teachers and instructors, the most popular parties were, in order, the Moral Force Party, 25.9 percent, the Prachakon Thai Party, 21.0 percent; and the Democrat Party, 18.5 percent. Among merchants and businessmen, the most popular parties were the Moral Force Party, 22.1 percent; the Democrat Party, 20.4 percent; and the Prachakon Thai Party 16.8 percent. Among respondents who

worked for private companies: the Moral Force Party, 22.8 percent; the Prachakon Thai Party, 21.5 percent; and the Democrat Party, 17.7 percent. Among self-employed people: the Moral Force Party, 22.0 percent; the Democrat Party, 17.8 percent; and the Prachakon Thai Party, 16.2 percent. Among farmers: the Prachakon Thai Party, 18.2 percent; the Social Action Party, 16.4 percent; and the Moral Force Party, 15.6 percent. Among laborers and hawkers: the Moral Force Party, 23.4 percent; the Prachakon Thai Party, 17.5 percent; and the Thai Masses Party, 14.5 percent. Among students: the Moral Force Party, 31.9 percent; the Democrat Party, 19.4 percent; and the Prachakon Thai Party, 14.1 percent.

Divided by Level of Education

When the sample of respondents was divided by level of education, the most popular political parties were as follows: Respondents with a primary level education: the Prachakon Thai Party, 19.5 percent; the Moral Force Party, 15.1 percent; and the Social Action Party, 13.6 percent. Respondents with a secondary level education: the Moral Force Party and the Prachakon Thai Party, both with 22.2 percent, and the Democrat Party, 17.9 percent. Respondents with a vocational education or diploma: the Moral Force Party, 22.5 percent; the Prachakon Thai Party, 19.4 percent; and the Democrat Party, 15.3 percent. Respondents with a bachelor's degree or higher: the Moral Force Party, 28.4 percent; the Democrat Party, 18.8 percent; and the Prachakon Thai Party, 16.4 percent.

The Most Unpopular Political Parties

The poll showed that the most unpopular political parties were, in order, the Prachakon Thai Party, 9.1 percent; the Thai Nation Party, 8.5 percent; the Democrat Party, 5.7 percent; the Moral Force Party, 4.0 percent; the Social Action Party, 3.6 percent; the Thai Masses Party, 0.6 percent; and other parties, 6.6 percent. A total of 39.3 percent of the respondents said that there were no parties that they disliked. Another 22.6 percent said that they didn't know or were not interested.

Who Is Most Suited To Be Prime Minister? "Big Sun" Received the Most Votes

Respondents were asked, "If you could choose someone, whom would you choose to serve as prime minister?" A total of 15.8 percent said that they didn't know or where not interested, 7.2 percent said that no one was suitable, 4.6 percent said anyone who is a good person and who has the ability to govern the country, and 1.7 percent said anyone who is elected. A total of 70.7 percent mentioned specific people whom they feel are qualified to serve as prime minister.

The respondents mentioned the following people: Gen Athit Kamlang-ek, 17.5 percent; Maj Gen Chamlong Simuang, 12.5 percent; Gen Prem Tinsulanon, 8.4 percent; Samak Suntorawet, 6.8 percent; Gen Chatchai

Chunhawan, 6.1 percent; Gen Chawalit Yongchaiyut, 5.3 percent; MR [royal title] Khukrit Pramot, 3.5 percent; ACM Sitthi Sawetsila, 3.4 percent; Phichai Rattakun, 1.9 percent; Chuan Likphai, 1.8 percent; and various other people, 3.5 percent.

Divided by Present Place of Residence

Bangkok Metropolitan: The five people mentioned as being suited to serving as prime ministers were, in order: Maj Gen Chamlong Simuang, 2. Gen Athit Kamlang-ek, 3. Gen Prem Tinsulanon, 4. Mr Samak Sunthorawet, and 5. Gen Chatchai Chunhawan. Suburbs: 1. Gen Athit, 2. Mr Samak, 3. Maj Gen Chamlong, 4. Gen Chatchai, and 5. Gen Chawalit Yongchaiyut. Nakhon Sawan: 1. Gen Athit, 2. Maj Gen Chamlong, 3. Gen Prem, 4. Gen Chatchai, and 5. Mr Samak. Chiang Mai Province: 1. Maj Gen Chamlong, 2. Gen Athit, 3. Gen Prem, 4. Gen Chawalit, and 5. ACM Sitthi Sawetsila. Khon Kaen Province: 1. Gen Athit, 2. Maj Gen Chamlong, 3. Gen Prem, 4. Gen Chatchai, and 5. Gen Chawalit.

Divided by Urban-Rural and Occupation

Urban respondents felt that the people most suited to serving as prime minister were, in order: 1. Gen Athit, 2. Maj Gen Chamlong, 3. Gen Prem, 4. Mr Samak, and 5. Gen Chawalit. Respondents in the rural areas responded as follows: 1. Gen Athit, 2. Maj Gen Chamlong, 3. Gen Chawalit, 4. Gen Prem, and Mr Samak.

When divided by occupation, the responses were as follows: Government officials and state enterprise employees: 1. Gen Athit, 2. Mr Samak, 3. Maj Gen Chamlong, 4. Gen Chatchai, and 5. Gen Prem. Teachers and instructors: 1. Gen Athit, 2. Maj Gen Chamlong, 3. Mr Samak, 4. Gen Chatchai, and 5. Gen Chawalit. Merchants and businessmen: 1. Gen Athit, 2. Maj Gen Chamlong, 3. Gen Prem, 4. Mr Samak, and 5. Gen Chatchai. Employees at private companies: 1. Gen Athit, 2. Maj Gen Chamlong, 3. Gen Prem, 4. Mr Samak, and 5. Gen Chatchai. Self-employed people: 1. Gen Athit, 2. Maj Gen Chamlong, 3. Gen Prem, 4. Gen Chatchai, and 5. Mr Samak. Farmers: 1. Gen Athit, 2. Maj Gen Chamlong, 3. Gen Prem, 4. Gen Chatchai, and 5. Mr Samak. Laborers and hawkers: 1. Gen Athit, 2. Maj Gen Chamlong, 3. Gen Prem, 4. Mr Samak, and 5. Gen Chawalit. Students: 1. Maj Gen Chamlong, 2. Gen Athit, 3. Gen Prem, 4. Gen Chawalit, and 5. Gen Chatchai.

Divided by level of education, the responses were as follows: Respondents with a primary level education: 1. Gen Athit, 2. Maj Gen Chamlong, 3. Gen Prem, 4. Gen Chatchai, and 5. Mr Samak. Respondents with a secondary level education: 1. Gen Athit, 2. Maj Gen Chamlong, 3. Mr Samak, 4. Gen Prem, and 5. Gen Chatchai. Respondents with a vocational education or diploma: 1. Gen Athit, 2. Maj Gen Chamlong, 3. Gen Prem, 4. Mr Samak, and 5. Gen Chawalit. Respondents with a bachelor's degree or higher: 1. Maj Gen Chamlong, 2. Gen Athit, 3. Gen Prem, 4. Mr Samak, and 5. Gen Chawalit.

Chamlong Close Behind Athit

Something worth noting is that when asked who is most suited to serving as prime minister, in Bangkok Metropolitan and Chiang Mai Province, the largest number of respondents said Maj Gen Chamlong Simuang. In the suburbs and in Nakhon Sawan and Khon Kaen provinces, the largest number of respondents said Gen Athit Kamlang-ek. When divided into urban and rural respondents, the response was the same, that is, the largest number of respondents said that Gen Athit Kamlang-ek is most suited to serving as prime minister.

When divided by occupation, except for students, who placed their trust in Maj Gen Chamlong Simuang, the respondents in the other occupational groups placed their trust in Gen Athit Kamlang-ek. When divided by level of education, those with a primary and secondary-level education and vocational education or diploma placed their trust in Gen Athit. Only respondents with a bachelor's degree or higher placed their trust in Maj Gen Chamlong.

In summary, most respondents placed their trust in Gen Athit Kamlang-ek. But respondents in some localities and in certain occupational groups and respondents with a bachelor's degree or higher placed their trust in Maj Gen Chamlong Simuang.

Advisor Sukhumphan on Cambodia, Superpower Ties

42070069 Bangkok SIAM RAT SAPDA WICHAN
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[Interview with MR [royal title] Sukhumphan Boriphat, a policy advisor to the prime minister; date and place not specified]

[Excerpts] [Question] Would you please explain Thailand's policy toward Mr Hun Sen?

[Answer] I think that there are several reasons why the prime minister decided to talk with Hun Sen. First, the world situation is changing rapidly. That is true at both the international and regional levels. Former enemies are starting to talk to and trade with each other. Thus, it is only natural for us to try and get to know Mr Hun Sen. Actually, regardless of what anyone says, he is the leader of his faction. He has held power in Cambodia for almost 10 years. Regardless of who is supporting him, he has been in control there for almost 10 years. Those who don't want us to have any contact with him at all or get to know him are going against the present trend in the world. That is one important reason.

Second, other factions have been trying to establish contact and talk with Hun Sen. This includes Prince Sihanouk. He has met with Hun Sen three times in France. Other ASEAN countries talked with him at the first JIM conference. Thus, there is nothing unusual about our meeting and talking with Hun Sen. Looking at

the broad picture, this may be new for us. But don't forget that Prince Sihanouk, whose interests are directly affected, has negotiated with Hun Sen. The Khmer Rouge talked with him, too, at the first JIM conference. Other ASEAN countries participated in the JIM I conference. I don't understand why people are so surprised about our talking with Hun Sen.

Third, it would be strange not to talk with Hun Sen. The four Cambodian factions are feuding. We have been in contact with three of the factions. But we have never had any contact with the fourth faction. That is strange in view of the fact that our interests are affected by what happens in Cambodia. There is no reason not to talk with the Hun Sen faction.

Finally, it is clear that a peace movement has arisen throughout the world. This is happening in this region, too. The prime minister feels that meeting and talking with Hun Sen will help promote this peace movement. As for those who say that this is a breach of diplomatic protocol, I think that in carrying on diplomatic activities, there are actually no diplomatic principles. Diplomatic protocol and the principles concerning whether or not to have diplomatic relations with someone are all tools for carrying on diplomatic activities. If a government can't use those tools or if those tools hinder the government in carrying on diplomatic activities, it won't use those tools. Thus, I don't see any use in talking about a breach of diplomatic protocol. We should focus on the results instead.

[Question] Is the government following the butt of the military? There were reports that it was the RTA CINC who contacted Hun Sen.

[Answer] The government doesn't have to follow the military. Those who make contact are not the same people who make the decisions.

[Question] Does that mean that in this case, the government asked the military....

[Answer] I don't know the background on this. But making contact and making decisions are different matters. If those who made contact forced those who make the decisions to do what they wanted, then the government was definitely following the military. But I don't think that that was the case.

[Question] There has been criticism to the effect that the efforts made by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs over the past 10 years to pressure Vietnam to withdraw its forces from Cambodia have all suddenly come to naught because of the prime minister's decision to meet with Hun Sen.

[Answer] That had nothing to do with the prime minister. I don't know the prime minister's views on this. I think that the policy of putting pressure on Vietnam and

Hun Sen is reasonable. But what we have to ask ourselves is, Is that policy still appropriate today? Can that policy bring peace to Cambodia? I think that these are the important questions. Vietnam has already promised to withdraw its troops. What purpose does it serve to keep beating them over the head? Because regardless of what happens in the future, Thailand and Vietnam have to live with each other. Geography dictates that. Now that they are at a disadvantage, we can afford to be generous and establish contact with them. We can extend our hand, because that will help improve relations between our two countries in the long term. There is still suspicion. But doing things this way is better than exerting so much pressure that they collapse. [passage omitted]

The important thing today is to try and prevent Vietnam from feeling isolated. They are already going to withdraw their forces. They have been punished and encircled. The Vietnamese people have suffered greatly. I think that it is time that we extended our hand to them, because that is in our long-term interest. Ten years ago, we were weak, and there were few countries on which we could rely. There was great disunity in the country. Do you remember that period? The armed communists had great influence. There were more than 10,000 communists. We were very weak. We were correct in trying to stop them. But look at us now. Where are the communists now? Our economy is quite strong. Our military is strong. We don't have to fear anyone. Our situation is now very different. If we continue putting pressure on them, that might force them to return. What happened at Chong Bok could happen again. Why should we do this when what the peoples of Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand are most interested in is developing their countries, not killing each other?

[Question] Some people feel that Hun Sen is using this to win votes. But Thailand won't gain anything. Would you discuss the advantages and disadvantages?

[Answer] To give you a simple example. I am not a businessman, but suppose that we decide to invest in something. The 1st month, our accounts show a deficit. Will you worry about the business failing? No. Because what you should be thinking about is what is going to happen in the long term. If we are still running a deficit at the end of the 1st year after expecting to earn a profit, then there is a problem. But there is no reason to panic after the 1st month. You have to think about the long term. They can go ahead and say such things. Because actually, no one believes them. The government doesn't believe them. This isn't important.

The important thing is that we have met and talked with them. We know what they are like. And they know what we are like. This has also shown the Khmer coalition that they must participate in the JIM 2 conference. Because if there is no JIM 2 conference, we may carry on diplomatic activities with Hun Sen. And then where will they go? Before Hun Sen came, it wasn't clear whether the

Khmer Coalition would attend the JIM 2 conference. But now that Hun Sen has visited Thailand, they will have to go. They are afraid that if they don't go, Thailand will hold more meetings with Hun Sen. And then where would they go? They don't have any country. They are now living in Thailand.

[Question] What is Prince Sihanouk's attitude?

[Answer] In my view, if we try and change his attitude every time he comes, we would go crazy. That's because he changes his position very frequently. What we should remember is that when we take some action, if possible we should try to maintain his good will. Because he is a senior statesman. The prime minister is trying to do this. But we can't let Prince Sihanouk dictate to us or tell us that we can't meet with Hun Sen. But we should try to maintain his good will.

Second, we should consider his real objective. If we focus on his attitude and words, we will become confused. But if we consider what his real objectives are, we will understand him better. How can we cooperate with him in the future? In his view, the Cambodian people are his people. He wants his people to live in peace and have a good standard of living. That has always been his objective. He feels that he can still play a creative role in Cambodia. Thus, he wants to play a part. He is trying to move the situation there in the direction that he wants.

If we remember this, we can cooperate with him even though there are things on which we disagree. But in the long term, we have the same objectives. That is, we want to restore peace in Cambodia and improve the standard of living of the Cambodian people. This is what he wants, too. Thus, we must cooperate with Prince Sihanouk again. It doesn't do any good for Sihanouk to condemn us or for us to condemn him.

[Question] What will our policy be toward the Khmer Rouge in the future?

[Answer] That will have to be reconsidered. Personally, I think that this is a very important matter. The problem of the Khmer Rouge is both a political and military problem. Politically, the question is, What can be done to get the Khmer Rouge to participate in governing the country without allowing them to gain too much power? That is the political problem. They can't be kept out entirely. On the other hand, they can't be allowed to participate unconditionally, because they would have too much power. I don't think that anyone has a solution to this political problem. The present formula is to have the four Cambodian factions work out an agreement among themselves. If they agree to eliminate the Pol Pot faction but keep other Khmer Rouge leaders that is their decision. We would accept that.

[Question] But the Khmer coalition has not eliminated Pol Pot. Will we have to adjust ourselves?

[Answer] No. That is their affair. If they feel that they should keep Pol Pot and can reach an agreement on this, I don't think that Thailand will say anything.

[Question] If Hun Sen rejects the Khmer Rouge, will Thailand, as the coordinator....

[Answer] Let see what happens first before we speculate on this. Because in negotiating, it's difficult to take a position before something has happened. We must make adjustments as things happen.

[Question] Some say that your group is like a group of children shaking a bowl of jelly.

[Answer] I think that that is a very narrowminded view. If the original policy had not had any weaknesses, Thai soldiers probably wouldn't have had to die at Chong Bok. Put simply, it's not that the policy was flawless. In view of that, we should be looking for ways to make improvements.

My students are 19-20 years old. That are old enough to be drafted into the army. I don't like this. I think that we should be looking for ways to reach an agreement. No one wants to die. Vietnam has taken a more reasonable approach. Everyone wants a better life. Everyone wants an education and a secure family life. We must try. If we don't, there could be trouble in the long term. We have to take a long-term view.

[Question] Recently, it seems that there has been a conflict between the advisory team and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

[Answer] I don't think that it is appropriate to call this a conflict. We just have a different point of focus. I think that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs realizes that we must change our attitude and be more flexible, because the world situation has changed.

[Question] There have been reports that ASEAN diplomats do not agree with the prime minister's decision to meet with Mr Hun Sen. What do you think about this?

[Answer] I have checked to see if this is true. I didn't have to check on Singapore, because I know what they think. I didn't have to check on the Philippines, either, because they aren't interested in this. It wasn't necessary to check on Brunei, because Brunei follows the lead of Malaysia and Indonesia. I did check on Malaysia and Indonesia. I checked with the men at the institutes known as the "think tanks" of the Malaysian and Indonesian governments. What I learned is that Malaysia is unhappy with our decision to meet with Hun Sen. The reason why they are unhappy is that they feel that Thailand did not consult with them beforehand. They feel that they were left out. But when they saw that Thailand had persuaded the Khmer coalition to participate in the JIM 2 conference, they were satisfied. They said that actually, their government leaders agreed with

Thailand's policy, that is, holding talks with the enemy. They agree with our policy of turning the battlefield into a trading field. That is what I learned in Malaysia.

As for Indonesia, they are quite pleased. I think that they are pleased because this is the first time that Thailand's policy has been in harmony with that of Indonesia. They want us to take a more flexible attitude toward Vietnam. They invited Hun Sen to participate in the JIM 1 conference. Thus, they were not opposed to our holding talks with Hun Sen. Prime Minister Chatchai showed great respect to President Suharto by flying there to ask his opinion beforehand. That gave him great honor. I don't know whether the mass media knows this because he refused to issue an announcement, but after the meeting with the Khmer coalition, he ordered the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to contact the Indonesian embassy and have them inform President Suharto that the Khmer coalition had agreed to attend the JIM 2 conference. It wasn't until 2 hours later that this news was released to the mass media. The prime minister told me privately that President Suharto is the host of these unofficial meetings and so we can't upstage him. The only thing that we can do is try and help Indonesia achieve success in this. Indonesia was very pleased by this. I don't think that there are any problems.

Thus, those reports were probably true for Singapore only. They were not true for ASEAN as a whole.

[Question] What is the attitude of the superpowers?

[Answer] The Soviet Union is quite pleased. I don't think that there is any problem with China. I don't have any data different from what you have. But I don't think that this presents any problem for China. The Chinese leaders and Thailand's prime minister have known each other for a long time. They undoubtedly discussed this beforehand. Moreover, the Chinese minister of defense was in Thailand at that time. Looked at superficially, Thailand would not upstage China. Second, China and the Soviet Union have reached an agreement on almost every issue. The only issue left is whether to keep the Heng Samrin-Hun Sen regime. But I don't think that that will pose any problem. I don't think that they want to reach an agreement on every issue, because if they did, the summit meeting wouldn't have any significance. They have to keep some issue for the summit meeting. At the summit meeting this May, I think that China and the Soviet Union will reach an agreement on all the issues. They will resolve all their differences. My only concern is whether other countries will be able to keep pace.

[Question] What about the United States?

[Answer] Frankly, they are not that happy. Besides Singapore, the only country that is unhappy about this is the United States. They think that we should discuss every issue with them beforehand. They don't like Thailand to make decisions without consulting with them first. But I think that this is more a matter of psychology.

Because actually, they are prepared to establish diplomatic relations with Vietnam. Their attitude is much more flexible than in the past. They have visited their consulate in Hanoi to see whether they can open an embassy there. And there have been many meetings between senior leaders. I don't want to mention any names, because they told me that they don't want to say anything about this yet. But they are taking a more flexible approach. However, they don't like the fact that we are standing on our own feet.

[Question] Besides the Indochina issue, with what other foreign affairs issues is the advisory team concerned?

[Answer] We are dealing with the issue of relations with the United States, economic relations with the United States. Americans and some Thais feel that the advisory team is taking too hard a position toward the United States. But that is not the case. We feel that their demands are unacceptable. We would like to get through this period. That is, we are bogged down with the issue of protecting intellectual property and with the GSP issue. Because of this, we have forgotten the things that we share in common. What are those things? Relations between Thailand and the United States have been very close for a long time. Thus, we should look at what we share in common. In the future, we would like to see economic negotiations carried on in an all-round manner instead of focusing on losing or winning on each issue.

We must try to find a way to ensure that both sides benefit even though there may be instances when we gain more and instances when they gain more. We have to look at the total picture. We can't go out to dinner and say, "you pay." If they pay, we will benefit, but they will lose. Or they will feel that they have been exploited. It's not a matter of who will win or lose today and tomorrow. You have to look at the relationship between the two and see who has the advantage over the long term. If one side has the advantage over the long term, steps must be taken to ensure that both benefit. I think that this is a better way to view this. This is what we are studying. [passage omitted]

[Question] Some people use the words "intellectual vanity" when referring to your group. By that, they mean that you are so wrapped up in yourself that you won't listen to others.

[Answer] That doesn't bother me. Actually, those who know us know what the truth is. If that were true, I would not be here trying to explain things. An instructor cannot have intellectual vanity. A good scholar knows his limitations. I certainly don't know everything. I know that I must continue to learn every day. Otherwise, I won't be able to teach my students. But if we all think alike, that is intellectual vanity. I admit that the support team of Ban Phitsanulok provides information, knowledge about law, economics, and science. I don't know everything. They have much knowledge. The world is very large. I am very small as compared with the world. I learn new

things every day. On the other hand, if we had intellectual vanity before, we certainly lost it after taking this position. Because we have learned many things. In the past, I thought that I knew a lot more than many of those in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. But that has changed. They have their own reasons. They have very good ideas.

I think that Ban Phitsanulok is a transit point for many people. We listen to others a lot, and we spend a lot of time talking with other people. I can assure you that we don't have intellectual vanity. Many people have come and talked with us about the things bothering them. If we were wrapped up in ourselves, we wouldn't listen to them. We wouldn't care about them. On the other hand, when we think that we are correct, we go ahead. But it's not true that we don't listen. We do. But we are steadfast. We don't become discouraged when problems arise. [passage omitted]

[Question] How do you feel about the fact that the government's policies on foreign affairs and economic matters seem to reflect the personalities or views of the advisors?

[Answer] Let me put it this way. Our scholarly achievements are well known. We have a certain level of knowledge. As for our collective character, which was expressed in the work done before we were appointed advisors, we used our common sense in analyzing things. I think that it is this which has enabled us to get along with the prime minister.

I am not at all idealistic when it comes to analyzing the Indochina problem. I think that we should try to stop Vietnam. But at the same time, we must try to improve relations. We can do both things simultaneously. Take the Rom Klao problem, for example. Initially, the violence increased. If we had been able to reach their leaders, I don't think that the violence would have reached that level. We had to have Gen Kriangsak Chamanan make contact.

I don't know whether I am right or not, but I believe that it is only common sense. That is, we can argue with each other. And we can admit that our interests and ideals are different. But that does not mean that we can't talk to each other. We must maintain contact with the other side. We must talk with them. That will increase our chances of solving the problems. Whether the problems can be solved immediately is another matter. But we should at least maintain a dialogue with them. Whenever a problem arises, we can call them and ask them what is going on. I think that we can do this with Laos. And we should be able to do this with Vietnam in the near future. Whenever a problem arises, we can call them and ask what is going on. I think that that would be a good change. I look at things using common sense. That is what the prime minister does. He uses his common sense.

Thus, I don't think that the government's policies simply reflect our views. Because the most important component of our views is common sense.

Government Notes Areas of Concern in Economy
BK2803050189 Bangkok BANGKOK POST in English
28 Mar 89 pp 17, 28

[Text] The Government yesterday expressed concern at six problem areas which if unsolved could retard economic growth.

The first is the country's ballooning trade deficit. In the final 10 months of last year, the Kingdom sustained a trade deficit of 96,000 million baht, up 117 percent on the previous year.

Although most imports were for the expansion of export-oriented projects, which will help expand exports in the future, the Government believes the situation needs to be closely monitored by the agencies concerned because if exports encounter any problems, economic stability would be severely affected.

The second problem is the uncertainty about the direction in which the world economy is heading.

The Government believes that although the volume of world trade expanded favourably over the past year, the United States still suffered a huge trade deficit. "This means protectionism in the world market will remain the main obstacle," one minister said.

Moreover countries in various regions have tended to group together to form economic blocs which will implement protectionist trade policies directed at countries that are not members. These groups include the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement and later the single European market.

Although Thailand is not yet directly affected by these occurrences, they have created uncertainty in the world market and Thailand's economy is dependent on exports. This has led to the government implementing two preventive measures including the search for new export markets and improving product quality as well as diversifying export items to boost competitiveness in the world market.

The third problem foreseen by the government is unbalanced regional economic development. Most of the economic expansion, particularly in the industrial sector, took place in Bangkok, the government noted.

The growth rate for industry in Bangkok in 1987 was 12.3 percent. Elsewhere it was 1.6 percent in the North-east, 6.0 percent in the North, 3.2 percent in the South, 5.3 percent in the East, 0.5 percent in the West and 10.9 percent in the Central Plains.

However, the government had implemented various measures to relocate industry into the regions such as increasing promotional privileges to investment projects in the provinces.

As living standards of urban and rural people are very different, the government has tried to help improve productivity and marketing for farmers so the people in rural areas will enjoy a higher standard of living.

The fourth problem is a shortage of infrastructure.

As the economy boomed during 1987-1988, certain infrastructure became insufficient to serve demand. This led to the government implementing various projects including private sector ones to improve the provision of infrastructure facilities. The Sixth Plan has also been revised to prepare for the expansion of infrastructure services in the future. In doing so, the government has been very careful in setting expenditure budgets so that the fiscal position would not encounter problems in the future by controlling external borrowings and encouraging the private sector to invest in infrastructure facilities.

The fifth problem is natural resources and the environment.

The expansion of the industrial sector and the rapid increase in population has caused environmental problems such as water, air and noise pollution, garbage and toxic substances.

A large population has also boosted demand for natural resources and this will affect the natural equilibrium. So the public must be encouraged to use natural resources with efficiency while at the same time preserving them.

The last problem involves foreign trade, including low prices of farm products, high prices of consumer goods, a shortage of raw materials, inadequate infrastructure, a trade deficit and protectionism.

Looking back on its performance over the past six months, the government noted:

Tax system:

- Restructuring of personal income tax to enable taxpayers to pay less.
- Introducing a value-added tax system which will eliminate double taxation.

Increasing public income:

- Increasing incomes for the public by restructuring salary scales of civil servants and state enterprise employees, and increasing the minimum wage levels.

Export promotion:

- Promoting exports by providing more packing credit facilities from the Bank of Thailand.
- Promoting the diversification of export markets.
- Promoting an improvement in the quality of exports.
- Promoting the establishment of export promotion institutions.
- Improving customs procedures to make them more convenient for importers and exporters.

Increasing the roles of financial institutions:

- Approving a Finance Ministry proposal to allow securities firms to engage in additional business activities to mobilise more savings.
- Supporting financial institutions to provide more monetary services to the public by encouraging commercial banks to open more branches in rural areas and allowing them to engage in additional business activities.
- Encouraging private firms to set up provident funds to increase savings which will be used to develop the economy.
- Encouraging and implementing the privatisation of state enterprises.
- Solving the problems of financial firms in the April 4 life-boat scheme.

Fiscal and monetary measures:

- Boosting the capacity of the Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives in extending medium and long-term credits to the agricultural sector.
- Using government owned banks to maintain or raise prices of farm products.
- Promoting the financing of loans for housing.
- Distributing growth to rural areas.

Setting policies for commercial banks to follow:

- Setting guidelines in extending loans for commercial banks.
- Encouraging commercial banks to open mini branches.

Improving the financing extended to entrepreneurs in priority economic sectors:

- Increasing packing credit facilities from 38,500 million baht to 40,000 million baht.
- Distributing the facilities to medium-sized and small-scale entrepreneurs.
- Boosting the facilities to exporters.

Infrastructure:

- Implementing various transportation systems, particularly those leading to the eastern seaboard.
- Solving congestion at Khlong Toei Port.

Investment:

- Boosting investment to 1,199 projects (from August 1988 to February 1989), compared with only 575 projects in the corresponding period of the previous year.
- Foreign investment during the six months was channelled into 424 projects.
- Encouraging investors to locate in the provinces.
- Improving promotional policies.
- Supporting investment of hotels in Bangkok.
- Encouraging technology transfer from abroad.
- Encouraging investment in electronics industries.

Foreign Economic Relations:

- Improving economic relations with the Indochinese countries.
- Improving economic cooperation with Australia, South Korea and Japan.
- Revising the Sixth Plan.

POLITICAL

Hanoi Radio Views Thai Policy Toward Indochina
BK2803051889 Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese
0015 GMT 28 Mar 89

[Unattributed commentary]

[Text] According to sources in Bangkok, a conference on trade and business opportunity in the Indochinese countries will be held in Bangkok, Thailand, on 28 April under the sponsorship of the Thai newspaper THE NATION. In its 23 March issue, the FAR EAST ECONOMIC REVIEW further reported that PRK Council of Ministers Chairman Hun Sen has been invited to the conference, and Thai Prime Minister Chatchai Chunhavan will be asked to preside over the conference.

In Thailand, many statesmen, scientists, businessmen, and technologists have talked a great deal about the need to conduct business activities with the three Indochinese countries in the new situation. Prime Minister Chatchai once said: Moving closer to Indochina is one of my first priorities. In his speech delivered at the Foreign Press Correspondents' Club on 22 December 1988, Prime Minister Chatchai evaluated the development of international relations in the years to come and the readjustment of Thailand's foreign policy. He stressed that under his leadership, the Thai Government's long-term goal is to turn Indochina from a warring zone into an area closely linked with other areas in Southeast Asia through trade, investment, and communications relations. On 14 March, Prime Minister Chatchai again declared that the Thai Government wants to turn Thailand's northeastern region into an industrial, service, and trade center to do business with the three Indochinese countries. The Foreign Relations Committee of the Thai Lower House revealed that it has agreed to consider the establishment of the Thai-Vietnamese Friendship Association and will send a delegation to visit Cambodia in the coming period.

Justifying his statements, Prime Minister Chatchai has visited Laos and invited Lao Premier Kayson Phomvihanh to visit Thailand; and he sent many delegations of


advisers, parliamentarians, diplomats, businessmen, bankers, and scholars to visit the three Indochinese countries. In the current economic development of Thailand's northeastern region, there arises the great need to link this region more closely with the Indochinese countries. Khon Kaen Province Governor Uthai said the people in Thailand's northeastern region strongly wish to turn this region into a center for international trade by upgrading land and air transportation and the local industry and building an international airport at Khon Kaen or Ubon Ratchathani for moving goods to Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. He also said that it is necessary to expand the road linking Nong Khai with Nakhon Ratchasima from two to four lanes. Nong Khai Province Deputy Governor Thani Wongsurachan called for the building of a bridge spanning the Mekong River. Representatives of Loei Province suggested to open the border with Laos on a permanent basis. Officials in Nakhon Phanom Province proposed the construction of a bridge linking their province with the Lao province of Khammouan and the building of a railroad linking Nakhon Ratchasima with Nakhon Phanom.

At present, the National Social and Economic Development Board of Thailand is working out a program for overall development based on Prime Minister Chatchai's initiative with the aim of turning Thailand's northeastern region into a center for trade with Indochina.

Paris Journal Reprints VAN NGHE Political Cartoons 42090186

[Editorial Report] An article on pages 40-43 of the January-February 1989 Paris QUE ME [MOTHERLAND] discusses the controversy surrounding VAN NGHE, organ of the Vietnam Writers Association that was reprimanded in September for "fostering hostile feelings" among the general public. The article reprints several political cartoons that it says VAN NGHE published in 1988. One of them appears to criticize the government for inhibiting free speech, while another accuses it of perpetuating conservative policies that prevent Vietnam from achieving socialist goals.

Trích báo Văn Nghệ
5.11.1988



Công việc đầu tiên của giám đốc mới
The first task of a new director

HOÀNG VŨ

Trích báo Văn Nghệ
7.5.1988



1) socialism

2) conservation

PHAN HỒNG

Hanoi District Party Organization Holds Congress

*BK2703040489 Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese
1100 GMT 26 Mar 89*

[Text] Hanoi's Tu Liem district party organization recently held its 17th congress to review implementation of the Sixth CPV Congress resolution during the past 2 years and discuss orientations and tasks for the 1989-90 period.

During the past 2 years Tu Liem district's grain production was almost 26,000 tons converted to paddy equivalent, exceeding the plan norm set forth by the 16th congress of the district party organization. The district industrial sector has effectively developed its consumer goods production and exported a volume of goods worth more than 2 million rubles. Noteworthy was that for the first time the district could export such traditional items as fresh flowers while producing for the capital a considerable volume of fruits and vegetables.

Hanoi Seminar Discusses Comintern

*BK2203071289 Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese
2300 GMT 21 Mar 89*

[Text] On 21 March in Hanoi, the Hanoi University and the Vietnam Historical Science Association held a scientific seminar on 70th anniversary of the Comintern.

Some 21 scientific reports evaluated the great contributions of the Comintern to the movements for national liberation and the preservation of peace and socialism, namely the process of national liberation in Africa and the antifascist movement. Many reports entailed intensive study of various issues, such as the Third Comintern and its impact on the formulation of the Vietnamese revolution's strategic policy, our party and the Comintern, the Comintern and work in preparation for the founding of our party, and the efforts of the Comintern in the restoration of the Vietnamese revolutionary movement.

Municipal Party Secretary Comments on Youth

*42090157b Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG
in Vietnamese 3 Feb 89 pp 1, 3*

[Report by M. L. on meeting between Municipal Party Committee Secretary Vo Tran Chi and Student Nguyen Mai Bao Tram: "To Be Successors, Youths Must Set a Course for Their Will;" first two paragraphs are SAIGON GIAI PHONG introduction]

[Text] The article entitled Confirming Communist Confidence (SAIGON GIAI PHONG, 7 January 1989) illustrated the tormented and confused mental condition over the present situation of many students and the self-struggle route—if it can be called that—of student Nguyen Mai Bao Tram in seeking that confidence. However, to the Municipal Party Committee Secretary, possibly the concern lies not only in this. The leading

generation has opened the way. The present and future strongly demand a succeeding generation. More than ever before, the party must have thorough understanding in guiding the youth in proper actions.

In the editor's office of SAIGON GIAI PHONG on 26 January 1989, Municipal Party Committee Secretary Vo Tran Chi informally met and talked with student Nguyen Mai Bao Tram.

[Vo Tran Chi] "An uncommon situation exists!"—he laughed—"The income distribution of many trades should not reach a point where intellectuals receive a hundred times the income of high-level intellectual laborers. Individuals who have received elementary training in and who have aptitude and ability in one sector are assigned to another sector. I have met many with basic elementary training who have used the two words 'labor assignment' in an ironic manner. Generally speaking, unfairness exists and poverty and backwardness are clear but there is also extremely great waste in resources, including time and grey matter. Tell me the truth. How do the youth and you in particular look at this situation?"

Nguyen Mai Bao Tram] "Let me say first that my family environment is relatively unique. I am a Group Four student (the last group in enrollee classification, comprising students with a family history considered complex—Editor's note). When I achieved outstanding study results, I received student financial support of 50 dong per month, while my friends in Group Three with the same standards received 1,500 dong per month. The problem is not the money but primarily the discriminatory treatment. Therefore, I see no need to say anything that is not the truth: in life there must be confidence. If not..."

A Page From Life

Bao Tram's father was a Lieutenant Junior Grade in the navy of the old regime and her mother worked for a former newspaper. When her parents divorced, her father left for the United States and her mother remained to raise four daughters. When her mother took up with a new father, a member of the public security forces, the "new father" also left his sector. This was the initial "load" of Bao Tram!

However, the weight of this load was not enough to hold Bao Tram on the bottom. Through her study achievements, she was one of four outstanding students graduating from Hanoi University to be retained for research in organic chemistry. She has twice won first prize in the nationwide political theory examination held for college students by the Ministry of Higher Education and the Central Committee of the Communist Youth Union.

[Vo Tran Chi] "Generally speaking, you are a person with will power but under the present conditions, what do you use as a basis for building communist confidence? Even a number of party members are unable to do that now. It should be remembered that ideals are not dreams, and increasingly must not be spoken of as immediate. When speaking of ideals, life no matter how easy is difficult. First of all, there are a great many social negativisms and the level of our resistance is still unknown. The harm is that in our management organization mechanism, every time a party member knows everything and can do every job and has no scientific or technical standards but still directs such work, he is forced to follow his subjective desires."

[Nguyen Mai Bao Tram] "Many times, I as well as many of my friends have become discouraged and tired and wanted to abandon our studies and tests. Each time we have such an erroneous idea and attitude, under no matter what form, we always feel extremely sad. Fortunately, I don't want to be stupid. The knowledge accumulated from hours of philosophical, political, and economic study have helped me to analyze and comprehend. Confidence comes to me from the ordinary thought that life requires action, at least in doing those things that must be done and not doing those things for which one must repent in the future."

[Vo Tran Chi] "Precisely correct. The road to communist ideals is not level. Because our preparations for the socialist revolution have been too rudimentary, upheavals in the situation easily create confusion. Not all party members correctly understand the situation. The economy of our country differs from that of the Soviet Union during the transition period, the world situation has now also changed, etc. In the democratic national revolution, we have created skilful steps forward, and in the socialist revolution, it is also necessary to uphold a creative will. The world has no model for us to follow and in this problem, no one can substitute for us."

"What the youth must do now to fully understand these complexities by acknowledging the truth of dialectic materialism is of truly scientific significance. My age group in 5 or 10 more years will give up its role. The succeeding road of creativity will belong to the youth."

[Nguyen Mai Bao Tram] "I feel that many of my friends have formulated extremely strong idealistic perceptions but when they encounter contrasting reality, extremely severe reactions are created, even to the point of drifting."

[Vo Tran Chi] "That is caused by the simple acceptance of dogmatic teaching. This shortcoming is not entirely of the youth but is primarily due to the fact that the party has long been lacking in an objective analysis of the situation, and in complete information."

[Nguyen Mai Bao Tram] "We give great emphasis to those small things which are highly effective and persuasive for the young."

[Vo Tran Chi] "Some youths have no will power, finding any way of living and studying acceptable. However, there are also many with great will power who know how to think. The problem confronting the youth in my opinion is the need to know how to set a course for their will. Affirmation and reaffirmation many times will set this course. Every individual leads an ordinary life. Youths must contemplate on how to prevent this ordinary life from becoming mediocre."

Editorial Urges Greater Renovation Effort
42090157a Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG
in Vietnamese 2 Feb 89 pp 1, 2

[Editorial: "Primary Courses for 1989"]

[Text] The Ninth Enlarged Municipal Party Congress evaluated the tasks accomplished and not accomplished during 1988; and simultaneously pointed out the primary courses for 1989.

During 1988, under the general difficult conditions of the entire country and the specific difficulties of the city, with a determined and resolute will to achieve the party's renovation viewpoint, the city developed a spirit of creative dynamism, dared to work and to take responsibility, and stimulated economic components to develop commodity production. Thanks to that, the city achieved the plan, maintained the rate of industrial and small industry and handicraft production, maintained security, national defense and social order, gave concern to the lives of the laborers, etc. However, the general situation has changed slowly. New factors have appeared but they are still few and weak, and have not yet been reviewed or widely disseminated. Resistance is still great from the old bureaucratic centralism and subsidized management mechanism. Renovation of the apparatus and achievement organization has been slow. Political and ideological education has not received the proper level of concern. All of these unresolved problems and shortcomings have had no small adverse affect on the results achieved.

Beginning 1989, the difficulties are still many and some cannot be immediately overcome but there are also new favorable aspects. These are the popular resolutions of the party such as Resolution 10 on improving the economic management mechanism in agriculture, and Resolution 16 on developing the non-state-operated economic components of the Political Bureau. There are the policies and methods of the Municipal Party Committee and the Municipal People's Committee that are consistent with practice, meeting renovation requirements and creating initial achievements. There is the trend of economic development cooperation between the three

nations of Indochina and those in the area of Southeast Asia that is progressing fairly rapidly and in which the city holds a significant position.

On the basis of these favorable aspects and difficulties, the Ninth Enlarged Municipal Party Congress outlined the following primary courses for 1989:

—Continue to liberate the production capability of all economic components, especially those under state operation. Exploit every potential of basic units along a course of strongly developing commodity production. Build and repair the infrastructure level to support the five socioeconomic programs of the city. Actively prepare the conditions necessary for foreign investment.

External economy, consisting of foreign trade and tourism, has been designated as a leading edge in developing the city's production. A program is necessary for producing export goods, and raising the density of manufactured and export goods through the goods sources of the city. Develop tourism and prepare facilities for attracting additional foreign tourists to the city.

—Continue to renovate the management mechanism, renovate the business and production formula, and completely eliminate bureaucratic centralism and state subsidization in state-operated economy. Shift all state operated and collective economic units (including industrial, agricultural, and business production) to true economic accounting. Cease accounting in a style of false profits but true losses with individual units earning a profit but the entire sector suffering a loss. Units operating ineffectively must be assigned to those operating successfully or each individual case must be examined for transfer to appropriate forms of ownership.

In agriculture, basically resolve the land crisis and assign land use rights to the farmers. Renovate the management formula of the cooperative and collective on the basis of household contracts.

To continue to effectively implement the management mechanism, the city will actively assist the central government in alleviating inconsistencies in finance, tax and banking policy—a great obstruction that is discouraging producers and businessmen.

—Continue to uniformly perfect and develop the social work program of the city to provide employment and housing, and study the problems of population and displaced personnel. Continue to develop wholesome cultural and literary activities with a socialist theme and national characteristic. Strengthen management in this area, and resist a trend toward cultural commercialization. Eliminate social ills. Continue to implement Circular 35 of the Municipal Party Committee on maintaining security, national defense and social order.

In political and ideological work, the primary theme is to affirm the routes to socialism, and to continue to more thoroughly understand the renovation viewpoint of the party, especially in economic activity, resisting conservatism and inaction. Teach communist ideology and the viewpoint of the worker class, and uphold revolutionary quality. Strive to overcome occurrences of vacillation and opportunism and a lack of disciplined organization.

The year of 1989 is a pivotal year of decisive significance. New factors appearing during 1988 must be confirmed and expanded into a movement during 1989. The influences of conservatism and inertia within each of us cannot be allowed to obstruct the progress of renovation. Within this general tendency, our city puts itself in order and begins 1989 with thorough and true renovation to actively assist in the general renovation undertaking of the entire country. We don't have a great deal of additional time to waste.

MILITARY

Logistics Role in Province, City Defense

42090164a Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN
in Vietnamese 20 Jan 89 p 2

[Article by Senior Colonel Le Hoe: "Active Preparation of Plans for Mobilizing Local Rear Services to Build Province, City Defense Areas"]

[Text] Recent training and exercises have shown that activation of local rear services in the operations of the province and city defense areas is an important theme, including the planning issue which has greatly attracted the attention of both army and local cadres.

In each locality, province and city, not only the local armed forces but also often the main force units participate in combat aimed at achieving the operational plan to protect the local area or to conduct campaigns in accordance with the intentions of upper echelons. Therefore, combat forces comprise not only the three troop types but can also consist of the air force, navy, army and people participating in attacks on the enemy.

The preparation plan of the local rear services is formulated and carried out on the basis of planning to build a strong province and city defense area in every aspect, coordination between the economy and national defense, and creation of an on-the-spot source of supply within each region. The plan to establish and create an on-the-spot rear services source is basic and primary, simultaneously connecting the source of support from upper echelons and other locations with firm coordination, labor assignment and decentralization between rear services in the defense area, and using the local military rear services as a staff and core oriented toward assurance of key directions, priorities and requirements throughout the local area.

Rear services base construction involves front, rear and mobile bases, and rear services complexes must be kept secret. It is necessary to organize hospitals to treat the lightly wounded, shops to produce weapons (mines, hand grenades, rudimentary weapons, military equipment, etc.), storage areas outside the bases, and units to ensure mobile communications. Most of the forces and material facilities of local rear services are provided to the defense area by the local economy and are organized and used for the military mission following a rear services and military nature. Therefore, rational and essential militarization of designated forces from local economic sectors is an objective demand. Each sector, first of all the grain, commercial, public health, industrial, communications and transportation, and post and telecommunications sectors, must determine their own plan.

When the plan is effectively formulated and achieved, all the self-defense forces, militia and people engaged in attacks on the enemy will have rear services provided at the primary level, the village and subward; provincial and district combat troops will rely on rear services from rear services complexes and bases; and the main force troops will receive support in grain, food and medical assistance.

Due to its special characteristics and theme, the plan for activating local rear services in combat is formulated through unified action of the planning committees, military agencies and economic and social sectors of local areas and ratified by the chairman of the provincial or municipal people's committee in achieving the mechanism of, "the party committee echelon leading, the government handling and the military commander commanding."

The military commander and agency develop their role as a staff for the party committee and government echelons to a high degree but not in the sense or degree to which they replace or exclude them. The party committee and government echelons rely on their staff, the military commander and agency, but this does not limit their authority, responsibility, autonomy and initiative or their dynamism and creativity. In renovation of the economic management mechanism, and achievement of socialist business accounting practice, stocking up on, creating a source for, reallocating and redistributing the local rear services materials and forces must constantly be carefully calculated and examined in the short and long-term aspects and from the aspects of benefiting or harming the national defense and economy. Needless economic waste cannot be accepted because of national defense requirements. Nor should excessively trifling economic calculations delay or interrupt the work of combat readiness or combat.

Actually, plans for activating local rear services in combat cannot wait until a war is about to or has broken out to be formulated and placed in operation but must be established and carried out during peacetime; and must be adjusted, supplemented and improved through each

period for consistency with the political, economic, and military situation in the country and the world, and in compatibility with the entire nation and the local area. Consequently, some tasks must be done immediately, completely and on schedule, some must only be partially achieved through several steps, and some can only rely on plans, equipment readiness, charts, and reserves for achievement when about to or actually beginning a war to protect the fatherland. Avoid a situation lacking in specific aspects, details or inspection, and anything that generalizes or calls for coordinating the economy with national defense, or national defense with the economy that leads to a situation demanding confusion and passiveness.

Hanoi Antiaircraft Group Makes Training More Practical

42090156 Hanoi HANOI MOI in Vietnamese
25 Nov 88 p 2

[Article by Nguyen Hoai Nam: "Hanoi Antiaircraft Group H77 Renovates Its Training Task"]

[Text] In the past years, like other units in the antiaircraft branch, Group H77 of Hanoi usually trained its men in accordance with the general plan assigned by its superiors. The illogical aspect that occurred in all units was the fact that they had to keep repeating training in accordance with the assigned schedules even in the subjects in which unit members had been well taught and that training in other subjects which should have been more concentrated was done in only a limited period of time as the schedules dictated. In 1988, the group has changed its training to better suit the practical combat needs. In the preparatory stage, the group allows its units to draft training plans on their own initiative and on the basis of their actual conditions and approves such plans 5-10 days ahead of the start of training.

Affirming that cadres are the activists in the task of renovating training, the group pays special attention to commanding cadres, control officers, and technicians; opens training classes to teach new subjects regarding the methods of organizing training and managing troops; and provides them with advanced training in selected technical knowledges. Cadres and technicians acquire greater knowledge and commanding ability as the result of such a training and afterwards can organize effective training in their units.

In the first training stage, the group adopts the method of dividing training into sections and mainly concentrates on teaching theories along with the fundamentals of basic combat activities. In the second training stage, the group devotes much time to practice, to be performed by both cadres and trainees. This training method saves time, and gas and oil, while it raises the level of coordinated combat action within and among detachments. During the training, the group reviews experiences once a week at the detachment level and once a month at the higher-than-detachment level, and plans for taking remedial measures to boost weak performance in any subjects.

According to Lieutenant Colonel Bui Van Binh, the group commander, in addition to letting the lower echelons draft training plans on their own initiative and creating favorable conditions for them to successfully fulfill their political task, the group command has regularly monitored the job of organizing training, strengthened supervision and control, and scheduled many alerts requiring switching to higher levels of training for shooting at targets in the air and launching ground attacks coordinated with mobile military operations. As the group is a unit having modern weapons, machinery, and equipment, its renovating the training task has been linked with ensuring that technology be applied to the signal and liaison field. The command has attached special importance to the training of the technical detachment and its personnel. With a technical force consisting of 11 engineers and 20 midlevel workers, the group has actively used discarded materials to make by itself a number of spare parts and components to repair all the broken pieces of machinery and equipment and particularly to fix 2 automobiles. The group's technical detachment currently has only two technicians who have served in the army for a long time and the rest being new soldiers. However, thanks to good training, the detachment is capable of properly fulfilling the periodical task of making ammunitions, which do satisfy all technical requirements.

In order to prepare for the branch's year-end real ammunitions-firing exercise, Group H77 has organized mobile operations covering hundreds of kilometers in which its members performed safely, moved quickly, and all arrived at destination. We can assert that the renovation of training has changed the concept of its cadres and soldiers and turned its plans and goals into positive results. The training task of the Hanoi Antiaircraft Group H77 in 1988 (marking the 10th anniversary of its creation, on 25 November 1978) has so far brought about obvious progress and great results.

15th Corps Operating Central Highland Rubber Plantation

42090159b Hanoi *QUAN DOI NHAN DAN*
in Vietnamese 13 Jan 89 p 3

[Article by Vu Van: "The Army on the Economic Front: 15th Corps—Results and Impediments"]

[Text] The 15th Corps [binh doan] is a military unit specializing in economic construction in the central highlands with a primary mission of rubber tree production and business, and consolidated business coordination (farming, stock raising, forestry and capital construction) in the economic and national defense areas. During the past 3 years, the corps has achieved a number of significant results: planting more than 1,700 hectares of rubber tree with a survival rate of more than 82 percent and a growth rate precisely in accordance with technical requirements. With an area of more than 3,200 hectares of rubber, except for that area under construction, 750 hectares have been exploited to produce and

process 695 tons of dry latex, completing the objective of delivering 640 tons to the state. In conjunction with rubber development, the corps is conducting intensive cultivation and companion cropping, each year interplanting with nearly 500 hectares of the rubber trees to harvest 850 tons of rice, 160 tons of peanuts, 74 tons of corn, and 1,000 tons of sweet potatoes. State farm 732 alone, specializing in the raising of wet rice, has achieved an annual output of nearly 800 tons, creating an on-the-spot source of grain for the corps. The corps' domestic animal herd, comprised of both collective and family animals, has reached more than 2,300 head of buffaloes and cattle and more than 1,700 hogs. At the beginning of 1988, the corps started an additional state farm for raising cattle. Coordinated forestry production is conducted in all directions with more than 8,000 cubic meters of lumber cut during 1987.

Of projects constructed, mention must be made of the hand tool production and repair plant, rubber processing plant, brick and tile plant, rice mill, and sawmill and furniture plant. Worthy of attention is that this total area included 2,500 square meters of category 4 buildings, used for a school, child care center, hospital, canteen store, service facility, bus depot and waiting room. Two centralized family living areas, comprising 170 households, have been constructed. With a shortage of materials and still many difficulties in labor and life, the efforts and results during the past 3 years have affirmed the situation and capability for advancement of the corps in the mission of developing rubber in the central highlands. Each year that the unit completes its mission not only produces economic effectiveness for the state but also assists in covering bare hills with green, overcoming forest destruction, improving the ecologic environment and gradually creating a social and residential area, and building a strong area infrastructure.

Practice has also indicated that the corps still has many impediments that must be overcome. First of all, because no model exists, the corps must work and study at the same time; the level of economic understanding is not great; habits of state subsidization are still deeply ingrained among the management cadres; and because the plan is not yet truly taken as the central aspect, actions are passive and piecemeal. Because there are also occurrences of confusion between state subsidization and accounting, the law and autonomy, dynamism, etc., production development has been limited, especially at the primary level. On the other hand, the yearly production mission of the corps is of a seasonal nature but the materials and supplies provided by the state are insufficient and late. Prices steadily rise while the state sets low investment rates and prices, greatly restricting achievement of plan norms. The corps, in its special nature as a military unit participating in state economic construction, has simultaneously supervision from the Ministry of National Defense through the General Economic Department, capital, material, etc. equilibrium from the State Planning Commission, relations with the General Rubber and Sector Department, and relations with the

Military Region as the echelon supervising party and political work, handling cadres, providing recruits and ensuring rear services. With two components following two systems (national defense and state) and four sources of ensured capital, top-heaviness and delay in management mechanism achievement is impossible to avoid, adversely affecting the production rate and economic effectiveness.

For cadres and technical workers, the corps has actively conducted training classes for 190 individuals, consisting of state farm directors, section and sector chiefs, key agency cadres, planning and financial personnel, salaried laborers and 42 production unit cadres. The corps has also sent personnel to non-military schools for training as nurses, medical specialists, doctors and drivers, in economic management, economic accounting, etc. Annually, in coordination with on-the-job training, the state rubber plantations conduct self-training for tree grafters and tappers. Nevertheless, because the management and specialized sector ministries have no schools for elementary training, this method answers requirements to a certain degree but fragmentary accomplishment, a lack of projection and additional expense are unavoidable. Along with the elementary training of cadres and technician ranks, research and experimentation are also necessary in the application of science and technology to production.

The corps' labor force consists of soldiers, national defense workers, professional military personnel and state workers with thousands of families and many thousand dependents. This is a fairly serious subject and social policy in an army unit engaged in an economic construction mission. The corps has also been able to mobilize 356 ethnic minority laborers for work in the rubber plantations, including 96 who have become official workers. However, due to present limitations in ethnic minority systems, policies and standards, special support from the central government and local area is necessary before the corps can invest in the area's economic, cultural and social development.

The corps is stationed in an area where living conditions are still arduous and rudimentary with much sickness. Recently, the state instituted policies of investing capital in the construction of new economic zones but this has still not answered requirements so the laborers do not feel truly at ease in connecting their new home and mission to the true meaning of "living in peace and contentment with one's occupation." Therefore, this is a problem that needs to be resolved without continued delay. To complete the mission of coordination between the economy and national defense, along with annual plan norms on the economy and the national defense mission, additional specific confirmation is necessary for the purpose of ensuring security and national defense under all conditions.

B61 Air Defense Group Makes Training Changes
42090162c Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN
in Vietnamese 17 Jan 89 p 2

[Article by Nguyen Huu Mao: "Initial Results in Air Defense Group B61 Training Renovation"]

[Text] It may be said that never has there been a year in the training mission of Group B61 in which so many difficulties were encountered as during 1988. Besides general difficulties of a universal nature such as insufficient material facilities for training, many difficulties and hardships in the lives of the cadres, etc., Group B61 also experienced extraordinary difficulties: from the very beginning of the year, units were at the disposal of mission "CO88," and in addition, many command cadres at all levels were replaced, resulting in limited supervisory experience and training organization. However, based on the party committee resolution on training for 1988 that stated a need for creating a course of true renovation in training, the leadership and command of Group B61 formulated appropriate and effective methods in strict accordance with the unit situation. Consequently, significant achievements were made in the group's training during the past year.

By working with the command cadres of Group B61 and seeking an understanding of the specific situation of various units, we noted that the training here has really experienced a renovation from both the direction of supervision and guidance by the commander and agencies and of achievement organization in units throughout the group.

The most significant renovation considered by the commanders of Group B61 as playing a critical role in 1988 training was in training planning. Previously, plans were usually presented and sent down by upper echelons. Lower echelons precisely followed that plan for implementation. This method seemed to create unity in training throughout the unit but results were not always good. In following the upper echelon plan, any subject in which the unit was already relatively strong would still require training and conversely, any weakness of the unit requiring improvement would not be in the plan, resulting in less than strict observance of training time in a few units, with some locations ending their training or reducing training time and participants to work on other things. Faced with this reality, formulation of the training plan in Group B61 during 1988 was done at the basic level and then reported to upper echelons. Following this method, unit command cadres could no longer remain passive as before but had to take the initiative from the very formulation of the annual training plan. To have a realistic and correct training plan, unit commanders had to answer two questions. First, with the actual situation

of their own unit in military strength, standards, strong points and weaknesses, what training is required this year? Second, with such a training theme and curriculum, how should the training be organized? Such a method of training plan formulation both expresses a democratic spirit and ensures a scientific nature. Actual practice has indicated that the more detailed and specific an answer is found for these two questions by a unit command cadre, the more effective is the unit's training plan with extreme initiative and efficiency during the achievement process.

The group's staff agency not only has a mission of controlling the training plans of units and contributing opinions for adjustment where necessary but also reserves time to invest in unifying the entire training theme and program.

Besides the work above, the staff agency of Group B61 also concentrated efforts on building a true agency for supervising training along a renovation course. A key step designated for building the agency is to improve the knowledge and ability of the assistant ranks. Study and training for staff agency assistants will also enable formulation of a realistic and renovated plan. Observing that training for agency assistants during a trial period of 5 weeks was of poor quality and lacking in effectiveness, Group B61 abandoned this method of study and regularly assembled the staff agency assistants for 3 to 5 days of study. Study themes delved into weak aspects and unknowns with a guideline of the assistants synchronizing the responsibility of and learning how to replace each other. This is really a training process of true struggle by the staff agency assistant ranks because the agency consists of missile, antiaircraft and radar assistants and those from many other sectors.

In conjunction with such knowledge level elevation, the Group B61 staff agency assistant ranks have achieved initial renovation in work behavior. Now, every assistant traveling to a unit is not simply restrained to listening and observing to compile a return report but is required to visit the classes, inspect each soldier student, verify the training plan and theme and discover anything incorrect that needs immediate guidance and supervision. This produces the compound result of further raising the assistant's standards and clearly reducing the number of reports from lower echelons that are not straightforward and honest.

Primarily from such renovation of the staff agency working behavior, there was much progress last year in the training supervision and guidance of Group B61. The unit's command cadres told us that at the end of phase 1 training, the quality achieved by the antiaircraft units was not yet truly high, and the group's command cadres and staff agency decided to devote all their efforts on these units during phase 2. Due to such prompt reorientation and total effort, at the end of phase 2 training, the antiaircraft units had achieved high results

in live firing training exercises. All detachments participating in these exercises were rated as good and above. The unit with the highest level was Detachment 71 (of Hong Linh Group) with 8.07 points. The unit with the lowest level, Detachment 31 (of Thang Tam Group), still attained 7.05 points. The gun and machine operation and use standards of gunners and radar operators have clearly risen. A great many soldiers in the exercises were acknowledged as outstanding gunners and radar operators, achieving 9 and 10 points, including some new soldiers inducted at the beginning of 1988, symbolized by privates Dao Chien, number 1 gunner, and Truong Ngoc Hoang, number 3 gunner, of Detachment 35, Antiaircraft Group H12.

Thanks to enthusiasm, initiative and renovation in training work, the 1988 training results of Group B61 were higher and more progressive than previous years. Group B61 was classified as the best unit in training during 1988 of the air defense branch and 100 percent of the missile detachments participating in practice firing at the end of the year destroyed the target, including Detachment 173 (of Group H77), 196 (of the Song Da Group) and 153 (of Group H58) in the outstanding category. In antiaircraft firing, Detachment 31 (of the Thang Tam Group) destroyed all the target types in all three firing exercises; Detachment 35 (of Group H12) destroyed the target in a dry firing exercise using 57-millimeter gun equipment, etc.

Nevertheless, unsatisfied with these achievements and results, Group B61 recently held two conferences to review and gain experience from the 1988 training work, to seriously point out the shortcomings and weaknesses, and to rise in fulfilling the mission of protecting the sky. This issue is the responsibility of commanders at all levels in training organization.

Aviation Group C23 Overcomes Training Problems

42090162b Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN
in Vietnamese 16 Jan 89 p 1

[Article by Tran Danh Bang: "Oceanic Freight Aviation Group C23: Many Methods To Overcome Difficulties, Ensure Safe Flight, Correct Progress"]

[Text] Aviation Group C23 carried out a training and combat readiness mission under difficult conditions with group forces scattered over many locations, unstable organization, and key cadres separated into small groups to closely follow missions on many airfields. In area A, prolonged bad weather adversely affected flying time and progress and companies had to train in distance flying and handle many complex conditions. The group party committee and command concentrated leadership by effective means on the mission of training, mobility and combat exercises.

Group agencies emphasized technical assurance and good aircraft and weapons preparation in order to fly immediately during periods of good weather. Units promoted a special movement, that of "Orienting Toward Beloved Truong Sa (the Spratly Islands)." The technical battalion rapidly deployed shops and made efforts to ensure good aircraft preparation and effective exploitation of weapons and equipment. The guide detachment maintained close contact with the new command post, closely inspected communication nets, practiced aircraft guidance and issued directives for prompt handling of conditions, ensuring safe flight and precisely achieving combat determinations. The entire group took advantage of periods of bad weather to conduct professional and technical training for all components. Thanks to priority training and a regular and continuous emulation movement, the group had 100 percent participation in the training flights, achieved 109.8 percent of the flying time level and 93.3 percent of the progress level.

Military Region 3 Evaluates 1988 Political Education

42090162a Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN
in Vietnamese 16 Jan 89 p 1

[Article by Dinh Be: "Military Region 3 Qualitatively Completes 1988 Political Education Work"]

[Text] During 1988, the Military Region 3 area, from agencies to main force units, strictly developed and implemented phases of political activity and study in subjects following the programs stipulated for recipients.

Political agencies at all levels emphasized establishment and strengthening of instructor ranks, lesson assignment in accordance with educational levels, and achievement of teaching and study evaluation for each lesson in order to promptly gain experience. Study forms and methods were gradually renovated and, through the lesson themes and in connection with the unit situation, the responsibility of each individual was designated and achievement organization methods discussed. Besides organization to study subjects in accordance with regulations, units also announced, propagandized and taught subjects such as the law, protection work, and the situation and mission of the military region and unit. On days of political study, companies created an atmosphere of frankness, democracy and openness in the unit. Through direct dialogue, party committee echelons and unit commanders were able to grasp the opinions and aspirations of the masses and the deficiencies of the cadres and party members to promptly initiate methods for educating each individual and halting erroneous actions.

However, the political education work in a number of units is still weak in quality and changes are slow.

Party committee echelons, cadres and party members have no deep grasp of resolutions, their application to practical activity still has many limitations and there is often stagnation and confusion when resolving new

problems arising in troop perception and ideology. Educational forms and methods are still monotonous and unilateral, and a number of commanders have washed their hands of political education for agencies and political cadres.

Citizen Advocates Better Gun Control 42090164b Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 20 Jan 89 p 2

[Article by Viet Ha: "Criminal Use of Weapons Has Not Declined"]

[Text] Last year, the social order situation had a tendency to worsen, crimes increased in number and severity, and the stratagems and formulas of activity became more ingenious, cunning, and blatant. Conspicuous was the violent, open, and ruthless criminal use of weapons that occurred in many locations. Statistics indicate that the number of crimes committed with weapons during the first 10 months of 1988 increased by 18 percent over the same period in 1987.

When criminals were discovered openly using guns, hand grenades, knives, and bayonets, they resisted violently by brutally using those weapons in disregard of the lives of everyone, including themselves. Reality has indicated that in the pursuit of criminals, many public security cadres and men have sacrificed their lives and many civilians have also been killed or injured. Criminals use weapons to threaten, coerce, and rob. In many cases, criminals have killed several people and created confusion and concern among the masses for an insignificant amount of property. Presently in many locations, weapons are used illegally and many cases occur in which weapons are sold or lost. Many cadres and men in the armed forces use their weapons improperly. Weapons are carried on leave or liberty and many cases have occurred in which weapons were fired indiscriminately and carelessly, threatening others, causing the death of many law-abiding people, and disrupting social order. The use of weapons to intimidate, resolve contradictions, and seek revenge leads to criminal offenses.

This situation has occurred due to many reasons and through study, we have noted the following that are foremost:

Weapons management is too lax with many still located among the people, civil cadres, and cadres discharged from the armed forces. Many individuals have collected them and there have also been cadres and soldiers released from the army who carry their weapons home where criminals seek to buy, sell, and steal them.

In army units, the use and management of weapons is not firm and not a few are lost.

Another reason is that we still have no plans for regularly inspecting those individuals who carry weapons.

To overcome the situation above, responsible agencies should:

- Organize a general weapons inspection throughout the country, and encourage all the people and those holding weapons not used in an official function to turn them in to public security agencies.
- Issue new regulations on the use and management of weapons consistent with the present situation.
- The Ministries of Interior and National Defense should issue new regulations on the authorized use of weapons consistent with the present situation.
- Authorities to inspect those bearing weapons should be stipulated in order to promptly discover individuals using them illegally.

Accidental Explosions Endanger Munitions Dumps

42090159a Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN
in Vietnamese 12 Jan 89 p 2

[Article by Nguyen Thanh Truc: "Why Can't Fires and Explosions in Munitions Dumps in Some Locations Be Halted?"]

[Text] Fires and explosions in ammunition and explosive material dumps are still sporadically occurring in a number of units. There are many reasons but first of all are the following two:

First is the violation of safety regulations in storing and maintaining explosives and weapons.

Second is management's carelessness leading to violation of safety regulations or creation of loopholes providing conditions to disreputable individuals for sabotage.

Whether the stockpiling, storage and maintenance of explosives and weapons is good or bad involves comprehensive conditions but because the storage dump plays an important and decisive role, a problem of a principle nature for an explosives and weapons dump is the need to satisfy the following requirements:

—The storage of explosives and weapons within a dump must be constantly normal with no changes in their technical parameters or characteristics, meaning that storage buildings must be well ventilated and without excessive temperature or dampness.

—Prevent explosions caused by the chemical reaction of explosive materials or by other effects (such as: sparks caused by bumps, knocks, friction, etc.).

—Ensure the safety of populated areas, collective units and other public facilities on the basis of designating and delineating suitable surface areas and locations to ensure the correct distances to prevent casualties when accidental explosions occur.

—Maintain secrecy to prevent sabotage by the enemy and disreputable individuals.

In observing the unit munitions dump situation, many locations properly meeting the above requirements have had no fires or explosions for many years with good quality of stored and maintained material. However, there are also many poor dump conditions worthy of concern, caused by too many unresolved problems that could lead to fires and explosions if not resolutely overcome in a fundamental and timely manner. By following and surveying a number of units with dumps and explosive materials, some points have been ascertained that must be overcome immediately:

—Location: A number of dumps have been constructed close to heavily populated areas or next to communications routes, and are difficult to manage and protect. Routes into and out of dump areas are muddy and rough, failing to ensure safety during the transportation process. In some locations, trucks hauling explosives have overturned due to bad roads and weapons have discharged during transportation due to excessive jolts.

—Specifications: There are still many storage buildings that are too low with corrugated metal roofs but no ceilings, dirt foundations and no protective walls. Temperature conditions are not ensured with excessive heat during the summer and dampness during the rainy season, damaging cases and packaging and rapidly degrading the explosive materials. Recently, the decomposition and explosion of a number of explosives of low stability have caused significant losses. Explosives and weapons disposition specifications for each storage dump of a number of units have not been strictly executed: unauthorized goods have been stored in the same building, the amount of explosives for each building and area often exceeds permissible limits, and irrational heights and dispositions lack stability and convenience for inspection and rearrangement. Lightning prevention is generally conducted in all locations but is still simple and all lightning arrestor and grounding systems are constructed in accordance with a model blueprint although the storage buildings in each area are different and have different requirements. In addition, arbitrary ground surface arrangement and failure to determine the explosion prevention radius between storage buildings have resulted in the sympathetic detonation of neighboring buildings.

—Concerning fire prevention and control equipment, not one agency has of concern. In nearly all units, the fire fighting vehicles and equipment are

fairly old, in disrepair and unusable but conditions for repair do not exist or there is no place for supplementary equipment.

—Management aspect: In many locations, management organization lacks firmness and a number of weapons and explosive materials of unknown quality, condition and production time have been allowed to slip through the net for common storage with the good explosives and weapons, with the danger of unexpected explosions and fires. Organization of maintenance during weapons disassembly and assembly and explosives maintenance is not being achieved precisely in accordance with regulations, and the disassembly and assembly of weapons in storage buildings has occasionally caused serious explosions. Dump personnel and receivers have not been well managed in a system of safety training and a number of locations have introduced personnel with no thorough understanding of safety techniques to the management of explosive material dumps. The existing problems above are the primary reasons for the recent explosions.

Song Lo Engineer Group Reorganizes Training
42090160 Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN
in Vietnamese 16 Jan 89 p 2

[Article by Ho Anh Thang: "Holding Fast to Reality, Renovating Training Method Organization in Song Lo Engineer Group"]

[Text] During 1988, the Song Lo Engineer Group was rated by Engineer Command as a unit with many new changes in the training task. Initially, the group established a training model consistent with the characteristics and nature of a river crossing bridge and ferry engineer unit and with the present conditions of the unit. Cadres and the unit command strictly reviewed the experience gained during previous years to renovate organization forms and training curriculums and methods. Problems arising during the training renovation process have truly been lessons for concern during the coming training year.

Speed and Individual Technical Skill Relationship Must Be Resolved

It may be said that a weakness in training during previous years that was clearly revealed in the rehearsal for the demobilization ceremonies at the beginning of this year is that the relationship between speed and individual technical skills has not been properly resolved, causing concern for group command. To fulfill the mission of a bridge and ferry unit, operational speed is an extremely important factor in which individual technical skills play a decisive role. In the Song Lo Engineer Group, the technical specialist force accounts for one-third of the total complement. Each demobilization further reduces this force so in order to have a full rank of technical specialists for timely replacement,

organization forms and training methods must be renovated. Lt. Col. Cao Chung, Group Deputy Chief of Staff, told us, "In a special duty unit like ours, the constant need for a rank of skilled technical specialists exists but is extremely difficult to achieve. When a soldier meets his training obligations of 6 to 8 months per year and attains a relatively firm (but not yet skilled) grasp of his speciality, he is discharged. This is not counting the many shortages in training and lack of conditions necessary for profound specialized training. We must therefore change the training methods." The opinions of Cao Chung are the supervisory thinking of the group's cadre ranks. To raise the technical specialist standards of each soldier, from the very beginning of the training year, nine training objectives have been designated in the unit. Each training objective, based on the nature of the mission, has a specific training curriculum and time schedule designated, but with different training for different soldiers within the training objective. The statement here is that in training, the group finds a consistent training formula permitting gradual resolution of the relationships between individual technical skills and the joint and operational standards of the detachment for connection to the norms in operational time.

Upper Echelons Teaching Lower Echelons or Skilled Personnel Teaching Unskilled Personnel

This is a new method in which Song Lo Group effectively experimented during the 1988 training. Up to now, not a few cadres have held the view that "upper echelons teach lower echelons" in accordance with a narrow concept. This is not entirely consistent for a special duty unit with themes in the technical specialist field and command and management cadres cannot be more skilled than the lower echelons directly engaged in their own speciality. A possible example is that a company commander could not teach a soldier to be a new driver better than a professional driver with years of experience in his trade. Last year, Song Lo Group carried out a training plan in which many "instructors" were simply officers or professional personnel directly engaged in the teaching. Included in the training plan, commanding officers also had specialized officers responsible for the training of many subjects. The ranks of specialized officers and personnel are endowed with technical and specialized standards, and many have trade skills and long tenure so have rich experience. With their professional abilities, they only require additional advanced training in teaching methods. Previously in Song Lo Group, there was a period of mechanically applying a guideline of "upper teaching lower" in accordance with the method of command cadres directly managing and training lower echelons. Because many cadres were newly graduated or had no knowledge in the technical speciality under their direct command and management, they encountered a great many difficulties. Following this formula, cadres and especially company commanders and executive officers had to take turns in the training. Following the formula above, the group

conducted unified study of a lesson plan for each training objective in the sector speciality and technical skill. On the basis of the unified lesson plan, the instructor was able to develop his assets of practical knowledge.

Along with the renovation of training forms for instructors directly engaged in training, Song Lo Group has emphasized renovation of practical training methods. This method can shorten theoretical training time in order to increase the time for practical training. Joint training between old and new soldiers is boldly conducted, using the direct actions of old soldiers as a direct "model" for the new soldiers to study. This is also a method for connecting the student with realistic action and avoiding nonessential training.

From actual training during 1988, the command cadres of Song Lo Group learned that the guideline of "upper echelons teaching lower echelons" is correct in cases of management and command training and in training organization.

How Does Class Organization Differ From Unit Organization by Company

In the Song Lo Engineer Group, technical specialists are the primary force. However, this force is not a single specialized sector. While working with us, a number of group command cadres stated that a training plan conducted in accordance with an induction objective is inconsistent because the recruits, after training, are all assigned to basic level detachments. Consequently, the plan cannot separate soldiers for training by their year of induction and is therefore inconsistent with the actual situation. During previous years in Song Lo Engineer Group, the training plan and organization were conducted by unit, the company. Actual practice indicated that not a few of the soldiers had to study and restudy a subject while the studies of some were not precisely in keeping with their speciality. Based on unit characteristics, the group this year has renovated organization in a form of class and group division in keeping with its technical specialist function. Nine training objectives in the group have been organized into 21 classes, not counting the cadre training class. Class organization does not depend upon the number of students in each class but on the quality of all objectives. Old soldiers or officers and professional personnel with skilled specialties and technical skills may be combined for direct training through practice. Of course, this method of organization will encounter difficulties in intermixing the companies. It will however ensure continuous training in individual sector specialization from the beginning to the end of the year and will provide a basis for following and evaluating the technical standards of each soldier. Study organization by class can also overcome the previous situation in which a company had many detachments studying, with the company cadres assigning complete control to platoon leaders after a general class begins and therefore being considered as having completed their mission.

During 1987, because implementation of training systems and schedules was not strict and practical training was not precisely in keeping with the functions of bridge and ferry engineering, weaknesses were revealed in individual technical skills as well as joint standards. With the new form of training, the group this year will place 100 percent of the unit in the field and conduct training on the Red River during the flood season. These are the most challenging conditions for simultaneously conducting training and testing the quality of the new training method.

From the form of organization above, the group has readjusted the previous curriculum and program on the basis of class division and redefined the daily training and weekly technical skill curriculums. In the daily technical skill schedule, the group has rebalanced the training curriculum and schedule for uniformity between specialized sectors. And, truly greater concern is given to the technical skills of the company and detachments such as conducting additional inspections or study organization.

ECONOMIC

Joint Cooperation With USSR in Hotel Building

BK2403085289 Hanoi VNA in English

0705 GMT 24 Mar 89

[Text] Hanoi VNA March 24—A 100-room tourist hotel will be jointly built on the coast of Bac My Han Ward, Da Nang Town of Quang Nam-Da Nang Province by the provincial youth organization and the Novokri Vorovskiy ore sorting complex, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.

This was agreed in principle by the two sides recently.

Under the signed document, the Soviet side will contribute 5 million rubles in commodities needed for the construction and the Vietnamese side, 2-3 million rubles in labour, building materials and equipment.

The construction is expected to start in December this year.

Survey of Second Largest Hydroelectric Power Plant

BK2703152989 Hanoi VNA in English

1445 GMT 27 Mar 89

[Text] Hanoi VNA March 27—Survey for the building of the Yaly hydroelectric power plant, the second biggest in Vietnam is being intensely conducted in Gia Lai-Kontum Province on the Central Highlands of Vietnam near the intersection of the borders of Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea.

The Yaly waterfall, 45 metres high, lies on the upper reaches of the Sesan river the largest left bank tributary of Mekong which joins it at Stung Treng town in Kampuchea.

The Yaly hydro-electric plant with a capacity of 650 to 700 megawatts will generate 3.2 to 3.5 billion kwh of electricity yearly, almost twice the amount generated by the Tri An plant, whose first phase of construction has been completed, 70 km Northeast of Ho Chi Minh City, and roughly one third of the output of the Hoa Binh hydropower plant in northern Vietnam, both with Soviet assistance.

In the first stage, a pressure tunnel and penstocks for a three-turbine power house of 335 mw will be built. Another power house of the same capacity will be added in the following years. According to Nguyen Van Ton, deputy director of the project, if feasibility studies can be completed in 1990, the first turbine generator may be put into operation in 1994.

Hau Giang Province Mismanages State Grain Collection

42090161 Hanoi *QUAN DOI NHAN DAN*
in Vietnamese 16 Jan 89 p 3

[Article by Xuan Minh: "Why Have Grain Collections in Hau Giang Declined?"]

[Text] As a province with one of the greatest capabilities for grain production in the Nam Bo Delta, Hau Giang during the past several years has been renowned for grain collections for the state that are rapid, orderly and large in volume. During 1985, the entire province collected 450,000 tons of paddy. However, during the past 3 years, Hau Giang's grain collections have seriously declined. While other provinces in the Nam Bo area such as Minh Hai, Kien Giang, Long An, Dong Thap, etc. have increased their grain collections for the state from 40 to 50 percent, Hau Giang collections have declined: during 1986 and 1987, the province collected only a little more than 310,000 tons; and in 1988 only 260,000 tons.

Why has the volume of grain collections in Hau Giang Province declined?

In working with responsible agencies of the province, we learned that the objective cause was that the agricultural production of Hau Giang during the past 3 years has encountered many difficulties and poor harvests. Of the agricultural land of the entire province, 480,000 hectares are used to raise rice with nearly 400,000 hectares divided into two clear production regions, a freshwater region and a saltwater region. The freshwater region, consisting of the districts of O Mon, Thot Not, Chau Thanh, Phung Hiep and Can Tho with an area of 198,000 hectares, has been affected by early rains, unfavorable weather, disease and insect damage, untimely variety degradation, etc., leading to reductions in grain output of from 10 to 12 percent. In the saltwater region,

consisting of the districts of Vinh Chau, Long Phu, Nghi Xuyen, Thanh Tri, My Tu, etc. with an area of more than 200,000 hectares, many more poor harvests have occurred. Due to deep saltwater flooding of the fields during 1986 and 1987, rice output losses were from 30 to 35 percent. During 1987 alone, this region suffered a complete loss over 25,000 hectares and Vinh Chau District required relief in order to subsist. This was unprecedented for a district located in this rice granary.

Consequently, the total grain output of Hau Giang during the past 3 years has clearly declined. The entire province harvested 1.52 million tons of paddy during 1985 but only a little more than 1.35 million tons each year during 1986 and 1987. It is estimated that during 1988, Hau Giang will only harvest 1.42 million tons of grain.

However, a direct observation of the truth confirms that the reason for Hau Giang's inaction and trouble in grain collections is primarily weak and lax organization and management of the grain source.

Grain collections for the state consists of paddy exchanged for supplies and fertilizer, paddy purchased among the people and paddy paid to fulfill tax obligations. Because all three of these grain sources have inefficient methods and lack firm payment and settlement inspection and control, shortages always occur during grain collection. Along with that, due to loose management, grain purchases and two-way commodity exchanges produce many negative occurrences resulting in losses of state grain. By the end of December 1988, the entire province had only exchanged and purchased about 100,000 tons of grain, 65 percent of the annual plan.

The organization and management of tax obligation paddy collections are in the same situation. Because the organization and apparatus for collecting obligated taxes has received no investment to build and raise vocational and professional standards, political standards, and responsibility and obligations to the state, tax collection effectiveness is extremely low. The cadres engaged in paddy obligation collections in the province, consisting of 50 individuals, 5 to 7 in each district and 5 in villages and hamlets, do not receive as much province concern as those in the industrial trade area and they constantly encounter difficulties in living conditions, must daily meet face to face with the people, travel over hill and dale to each village and hamlet, etc., and nearly all are unenthusiastic over actively collecting taxes and are reluctant to confront the farmers. On the other hand, the province has no method for urgently resolving obstacles in agricultural tax obligations that have mounted for many years such as field and orchard tax debts, creating an adverse psychology among the farmers. Many farmers in Vinh Chau District told us, "People with 3-year-old tax debts have not yet paid. We have paddy this year but if we don't pay, how will it look?"

For the reasons above, the collection of grain tax obligations in Hau Giang is inactive and troubled. According to the grain obligation tax register, Hau Giang during 1988 must collect 80,000 tons of grain but to this time, only 45,000 tons have been collected, only about 55 percent of the planned level.

Due to loose organization in grain source control, many negative occurrences have appeared during the past few years in grain collections for the state. Prominent among these were the illegal use of materials and fertilizer, failure to use them in support of agriculture, and two-way exchanges for goods to sell on the free market in search of profit. We learned through responsible management agencies and charges made by the farmers that nearly 30 percent of the production collectives in the province have sold materials and fertilizer on the market. Some districts have arbitrarily used up to 7,000 tons of grain in the state's grain collection fund to exchange for goods, capital rotation and misappropriation for private funds. Some villages have sold a full 100 tons of gasoline, oil and fertilizer to peddlers. In the districts of That Not, Vi Thanh, Long Phu, Phung Hiep, etc., negative occurrences such as these have appeared, resulting in losses of tens of thousands of tons of grain that should have been used in fulfilling state obligations.

In the collection of tax obligation paddy, taking advantage of loose provincial and district management, many production collectives have reported low tax assessment levels or requested arbitrary tax waivers and reductions, etc. After receiving a tax waiver or reduction, production collectives have not reported to the people or have submitted reports lower than the total amount of paddy waived in order to later misappropriate the surplus. Inspections of many production collectives in the province have uncovered thousands of tons of this fraudulent paddy. For example, an inspection in Binh Thanh Village of Phung Hiep District alone uncovered 47 tons of paddy.

Among the cadres collecting grain obligation taxes are those misappropriating paddy by registering full tax collection receipts with the people but submitting extremely low settlement receipts to the state. In Binh Thanh Village (of Phung Hiep District), Dong Hiep Village (O Mon District), Xuan Hoa Village (Ke Sach District), etc., the amount of paddy misappropriated by this method has reached more than 100 tons. Some tax collection invoices with a monetary value of 240,000 dong have been registered with the state as only 4,000 dong.

Worthy of attention is that in Hau Giang, with a record level of obligated paddy debts, no urgent solution has been achieved for the past 3 continuous years. At the present time, the total amount of obligated paddy still owed the state is 42,895 tons, the largest amount of 6,263 tons owed by Vi Thanh District. However, during the year of 1988, the entire district was able to collect only 5,767 tons.

Grain collection for the state is a duty and responsibility of local areas. In Hau Giang, this extremely urgent problem must be resolved. The province is striving to strengthen grain organization and management and to eliminate negative occurrences in grain collection.

These are the very things that must be accomplished immediately and now.

Increased Production, Poorer Living Standard in HCM City

42090155 Ho Chi Minh City SAIGON GIAI PHONG in Vietnamese 28 Jan 89 p 1

[Article by H.V.K.: "Yesterday, 27-1, Opening of 15th Session of Ho Chi Minh City Municipal People's Council—1988: Industrial Output Increased by 13 Percent, But Standard of Living Continued To Decline"]

[Text] Yesterday, 27-1, the People's Council of the municipality met at the opening meeting of its 15th regular session to evaluate the achievements made while carrying out the 1988 socioeconomic plan and to discuss the direction, goals, and tasks set for the municipality in 1989.

The report of the Municipal People's Committee on the municipality's conditions in the last year pointed out as follows: In 1988, the municipality still encountered very many difficulties, particularly in its economic activities, such as lack of materials and raw materials, shortage of capital and cash, price and price rate fluctuations, illogical tax policy, restricted policy mechanism, reduced budget, and so on. But the last year also was one in which the municipality had been quickly and creatively applying the new positions, resolutions, and policies of the party and state to economic activities, particularly to encouraging and developing the capabilities of all economic components in favor of developing their production and to strongly expanding their economic activities abroad. Consequently, in 1988, the gross output of the municipality's industry, small industry, and handicrafts reached a total value of 42.7 billion dong (100.5 percent of its plan), an increase of 13.3 percent over 1987, and the total value of its export amounted to 240 million rubles-dollars, with the capitalist markets accounting for 195.4 million dollars (101.2 percent of its plan); agriculture accounting for only 90 percent of the grain production plan; all other crops and animals raised failing to fulfill the plan goals; and 81,000 people getting jobs (of that figure 68,000 got jobs outside of the state-operated production sector).

However, according to the report, the standard of living of the working people continued to decline, and social order and security still got worse. The municipality showed many shortcomings in socioeconomic management and operations, which remained not so extensive, lacked synchronization, and still ran after quantity as

objective, with no calculation of effectiveness, slackened management, absence of control, and failure to fully develop the work function of the basic level.

Some of the major goals of a projected 1989 socioeconomic plan as proposed by the People's Committee for discussion and decision by council members were as follows: The value of gross production of industry, small industry, and handicrafts was set at 50 billion dong (based on the 1982 fixed prices), an increase of 17 percent over 1988; grain, at 250,000 tons, a 6 percent increase; hogs, 200,000 heads, an 11 percent increase; export, 310 million rubles-dollars (including 250 million dollars), a 29.2 percent increase; and import, 230 million rubles-dollars (including about 8 percent being raw materials, materials, and equipment), a 10 percent increase.

The conference is still under way.

Winter-Spring Rice Crop Encounters Difficulties
42090166 Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN
in Vietnamese 25 Jan 89 p 3

[Article by Trong Nghia: "Present Winter-Spring Crop Production Situation and Problems Requiring Solution"]

[Text] During 1988, despite great natural disasters and heavy losses in a number of regions, thanks to overall efforts on the agricultural front, the entire nation produced 19 million tons of grain in paddy equivalent. To achieve an objective of 21 to 22 million tons in 1990, during this year of 1989, as stated by the resolution of the recent Fourth Session of the Eighth National Assembly: it is necessary to attain a grain output of 20 million tons (including 17.5 million tons of paddy), a 5.2 percent increase over 1988. The general course of the entire country is to develop the goods economy and the strong points of each region to resolve the grain problem in a highly effective manner.

To assist the nation in achieving the struggle objective above, every effort must be made for the 1988-1989 fifth-month-spring rice crop to successfully attain a norm of 1,069,000 cultivated hectares with an output of more than 32 quintals per hectare and a harvest of 3.49 million tons of paddy. This objective, if fully attained, will have a value equivalent to the paddy output of the 1987-1988 fifth-month-spring crop, the crop with the highest paddy yields and output since 1985.

According to guidance from the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Industry on the ability of the north to achieve the total output above, the requirements each region must strive in achieving are as follows: in the Red River delta, more than 50,000 hectares must be attained with yields of more than 36 quintals per hectare and an output of more than 1,800,000 tons. In the midlands, the area to be attained must be about 15,000 hectares with yields of more than 28 quintals per hectare and an output of 420,000 tons. In the highlands, 103,000 hectares in area must be attained with a yield of more than 25 quintals

per hectare and an output of 265,000 tons. Region 4 must attain 315,000 hectares with a yield of more than 29 quintals per hectare and an output of 923,000 tons. The Red River delta is the key grain area of the north, accounting for more than 50 percent of the cultivated area and more than 60 percent of the total output.

To ensure normal development of agricultural production in the north at the present time, it is necessary to figure the following factors and problems: regarding hydrography and meteorology: according to general forecasts, this fifth-month-spring crop must withstand earlier and more severe cold weather than any previous year; the overall temperature will be lower than the average over many years; and January and February 1989 will be dry and cold. During these same 2 months, days of much heavier rain than during 1988 will occur, but the overall rainfall will be lower. According to data of the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Industry, the rainfall during 1988 was 300 to 700 millimeters less than the average over many years. Consequently, the water in ponds, lakes and reservoirs is only at 50 to 60 percent of designed levels. In the river basins, water levels are also extremely low. In Hanoi for example (measured on 2 January 1989), the level was only 2.42 meters. In Thanh Hoa, drought has adversely affected about 7,000 hectares. In Hai Hung, Ha Nam Ninh and Ha Son Binh, there is also the danger of water shortages. Even in the marshy field areas, shortages of water for the fifth-month-spring crop have appeared. Also according to the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Industry, at the beginning of January 1989, although official data on the area affected by drought is still insufficient, estimates are that more than 100,000 hectares are in extreme need of water for transplanting rice seedling on schedule.

Faced with such a changing and complex meteorological and hydrographic situation, agriculture demands truly flexible and skillful handling. If not handled well, the seedlings will age and become leggy. If handling of the seedlings is not good, the rice will easily die. Active and dynamic methods are necessary to overcome drought damage because drought this year will surely be severe.

Fertilizer preparation: the volume of chemical fertilizer by the end of January 1989 will reach 360,000 tons of the total 400,000 tons in plan norms. Thus, chemical fertilizer may be used for primary application and top-dressing during phase I. Continued efforts made be made to acquire insecticides because 5,000 tons are required and there are now only 1,000 tons. In land cultivation: at the beginning of January 1989 in the northern provinces, the plowing was basically complete with the lowland provinces breaking 360,000 hectares to the plow along with more than 150,000 hectares of winter rice, leaving only 2 percent of the area to be plowed.

Seedling sowing: according to data of the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Industry, by 25 December 1988, 103,000 hectares had been sowed in accordance with the

norm of one bed per eight or nine fields. Worthy of note in the present seedling situation is that the early and main spring crops have not met planned estimates of 80 percent with only 70 percent of the area attained. Therefore, the area of late spring seedlings has risen to from 100,000 to 200,000 hectares. Although the seedlings are stunted and full, a portion have reached transplanting age, including about 30,000 hectares with 4.5 to 5 leaves and about 40,000 hectares with 4 to 4.5 seedlings.

Urgent issues requiring solution in supervision of this fifth-month—spring crop production are solution of the seedling problem and reinspection of the entire seedling assurance step in order to uniformly regulate surpluses and shortages. Absolutely do not transplant old seedlings. Urgently prepare seed to organize a sowing of late spring seedlings after the great cold solar period (20 January). Care for and nurture the seedlings sown after 5 December. Second is to ensure firmly supervised electric power and water to properly achieve the interministerial plan of supplying 90,000 to 100,000 kilowatts to regions with electric pumps after 1 January 1989. Give priority during the first days of February to the coastal provinces affected by rising tides such as Thai Binh, Ha Nam Ninh and Haiphong. Firmly supervise the acquisition of water precisely in accordance with the registered schedule, properly manage the water sources obtained, and prevent water leakage and escape.

Third is to promote the harrowing rate when there is water to loosen the soil. In those locations where no plowing has been done, take advantage of the warm weather to actively complete the work. To accelerate the cultivation rate, besides a requirement for the buffaloes and cattle of the cooperative members and the small tractors of the cooperative, it is necessary to develop the land cultivation capabilities of large tractors on the basis of signing direct contracts with production units or groups and families. Based on the ground cultivation and seedling regulation, if weather allows the seedlings to reach the proper age, the transplanting rate must be accelerated. Strive to complete the transplanting before the lunar new year (6 February 1989) over 50 to 60 percent of the area.

Fourth is to organize widespread propaganda to each cooperative member family and farmer to apply such methods in the crop technology step as follows: first apply only one-third to one-half the primary nitrate fertilizer intended for use (about 2 to 3 kilograms of urea per sao) to avoid heading of the rice if warm weather is encountered. Seedlings must be scooped out for transplanting to avoid killing them with cold weather if light drizzle or northeast winds are encountered.

Generally speaking, the fifth-month—spring crop this year has some favorable preconditions but there are also complex difficulties, including the problems of weather and water which are objective factors with extremely great effects. Therefore, all echelons and regions must maintain close contact with and firmly

grasp the changing situation to provide close, flexible and dynamic supervision and prompt handling like a combat front command and surely we will attain a successful fifth-month—spring crop.

Cement Enterprises Federation Exceeds 1988 Plan Target

42090173 Hanoi HANOI MOI in Vietnamese
1 Dec 88 p 1

[Summary] By the end of November, cement production in 1988 by members of the Federation of Cement Enterprises had reached 1.54 million tons, an amount equal to 99 percent of the 1987 total. The 1988 plan target assigned to the federation was 1.61 million tons. The Hoang Thach, Bim Son and Ha Tien plants were the highest producers.

Despite many difficulties, the federation and its units implemented many practical, positive measures to achieve their results. Specifically, they successfully transported 150,000 tons of clinker to southern provinces and found sources of foreign exchange to buy paper for cement sacks, fireproof brick, and replacement parts. On the other hand, federation members also implemented some new administrative, organizational and personnel reforms to improve production at the major cement plants at Bim Son and Ha Tien. Thanks to the production increases, since July the federation's average monthly revenue has been 35,000 dong. Not counting the Hai Phong cement works, the other federation member units have raised the average revenue to 43,000-45,000 dong per month. Quality has improved noticeably, and the state gave the Premium Quality Seal to P.300 cement from the Bim Son plant.

SOCIAL

France Floats Plan for Refugee Watch

42000102 Jakarta ANTARA NEWS BULLETIN
in English 27 Feb 89 p B-3

[Text] Kuala Lumpur, Feb. 26 (ANTARA/AFP)—France is seeking support from several Asian Governments for a plan to place ships in the South China Sea to ensure Vietnamese boat people are not forcibly pushed back to sea, a senior French official said here Sunday.

Bernard Kouchner, French Secretary of State for humanitarian policies, said at the end of a five-day visit to Malaysia that the vessels would be managed by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

"I don't think money is a problem. The funds will be available if there is support for the proposal," he said, adding: "I have received polite acknowledgement for the plan."

Dr. Kouchner visited the Philippines before holding talks in Malaysia with Deputy Prime Minister Abdul Ghafar Baba and Deputy Foreign Minister Abdullah Fadzil Che Wan. He also recently visited Hong Kong and Thailand.

Malaysian officials were not immediately available for comment. Officials here have previously underlined Kuala Lumpur's humane treatment of all Vietnamese boat people and said no refugee vessels have been pushed out to sea.

Dr. Kouchner told AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE he expected his proposal to be taken up at an international conference on Indochinese refugees in Geneva in June.

Seventeen countries, including France, the United States and Southeast Asian nations which have hosted tens of thousands of Indochina refugees, will hold preparatory talks for the Geneva conference here next month, diplomats said.

Dr. Kouchner said France would honour its commitment to resettle refugees from Indochina if countries like Malaysia, Thailand and Hong Kong continued to grant temporary asylum to the boat people.

"It would be a shame, a crime against humanity to push these people out to sea. It would be a breach of the 1951 Geneva Accord on refugees," he said.

Dr. Kouchner said France felt the boat people should be given "first asylum" in the countries they land in while the international community continued efforts to persuade Vietnam to allow legal departures through the orderly departure programme.

France is the second largest recipient of Indochinese refugees after the United States, resettling some 130,000 people since the exodus began after 1975, he said. (U/E17/89-02-27-00:18)

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